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THE MORAL HAZARD PARADOX OF
FINANCIAL SAFETY NETS
John Crawford*
Moral hazard plays a central role in almost every narrative of the
recent financial crisis: the government’s implicit guarantees led to ex-
cessive risk-taking, and when the guarantees turned explicit, it exacer-
bated moral hazard going forward.  The moral hazard narrative of crisis
causes and effects motivated key reform efforts, including the statutory
elimination of authorities regulators used to guarantee trillions of dol-
lars of private debt in an effort to halt widespread panic in late 2008.
Some argue that the elimination of these broad guarantee authorities
was a mistake, but even these critics acknowledge that the moral hazard
costs of guarantees are significant.
This Article argues that the absence of broad guarantee authorities
could, counterintuitively, exacerbate moral hazard in the current U.S.
financial system.  Broad guarantee authorities can be seen as a “strong”
tool for stopping panics.  Stripped of this strong tool, regulators never-
theless retain a number of weaker tools that, while unequal to containing
a full-blown panic, might prevent one from starting in the first place
through targeted bailouts of specific firms or their creditors.  Lacking a
strong panic-prevention tool, regulators are likelier to err on the side of
caution in saving a weak firm even when the firm’s failure might not
have sparked a panic.  It is possible, therefore, that weak firms are more
likely, rather than less likely, to be bailed out in the current system.
If guarantee powers make bailouts less likely under some condi-
tions, their impact on moral hazard—which arises from bailout expecta-
tions—is ambiguous.  This strengthens the case for reestablishing broad
guarantee authorities.
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INTRODUCTION
Strong firefighting authorities actually make it eas-
ier to let firms fail; when you know you have the ability
to prevent fires from spreading out of control, you can
afford to let them burn for a while.
- Timothy Geithner1
Perversely, the lack of deposit insurance [in China]
has made [it] even less likely [that any bank would be
allowed to go under,] as this would hurt depositors,
threatening social stability.
- Aaron Back, Wall Street Journal2
As the financial system unraveled in 2008, regulators engaged in a
series of ad hoc interventions to rescue particular financial institutions
out of fear that their failure could cause a panic.3  When they finally let a
large financial firm fail, it did spark a panic.4  Regulators responded by
1 TIMOTHY F. GEITHNER, STRESS TEST: REFLECTIONS ON FINANCIAL CRISES 431–32
(2014).
2 Aaron Back, China Lays Down Deposit on Banking Reform, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 28,
2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/china-lays-down-deposit-on-banking-reform-heard-on-the-
street-1417152249 (describing recent moves by Chinese financial authorities to establish de-
posit insurance).
3 See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT chs. 15, 17
& 19–20 (2011), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf [hereinafter
FCIC REPORT] (describing financial institutions saved by regulatory interventions in 2008,
including investment bank Bear Stearns, mortgage giants Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, insur-
ance behemoth AIG, and bank Wachovia).
4 The firm, of course, was Lehman Brothers. See infra Part I.A.
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using creative interpretations of particular statutory authorities to extend
trillions of dollars of guarantees to the financial system.5  It is difficult to
overstate the damage the panic would likely have wrought had it not
been for these guarantees.  The guarantees assured creditors that the fed-
eral government stood behind the debt of private borrowers, squelching
their incentive to run.6  The guarantees were extended on the basis of
freestanding authorities7 that have since been eliminated by statute.8
Why would Congress strip regulators of the very tools they used to
save the financial system?  The most frequent answer is that the guaran-
tees exacerbated moral hazard.9  Creditors who believe the government
will make them whole when the borrower defaults are unlikely to impose
discipline on risky financial institutions by, for example, charging higher
interest rates to compensate for the risk of default.  This is not mere spec-
ulation: studies have established that bond prices do not fully incorporate
5 The Department of the Treasury guaranteed money market fund accounts. See infra
Part I.A.  The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) guaranteed uninsured deposits in
non-interest-bearing accounts, as well as certain quantities of long-term debt issued by banks
and bank holding companies.  For a description of these FDIC guarantees, see infra Part
II.B–C.
6 See infra Part I.A.  A “run” occurs when short-term creditors of a financial institution
(such as depositors at a bank), who in the normal course allow their loans to “roll over,”
withdraw their funds en masse.  For a discussion of a run’s pernicious consequences, see infra
Part II.
7 The term “authorities” refers to particular actions, such as extending a loan to a private
institution, that regulators have been authorized to do by statute (or by regulations promulgated
pursuant to statutory authority).  “Freestanding” refers to authorities grounded in existing stat-
utes that require no further congressional action to be employed by regulators.  “Guarantee”
here means a legally binding promise to pay creditors what they are owed in the event that the
debtor cannot.
8 The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 repealed the authority relied on
by the Treasury Department in providing a multi-trillion-dollar guarantee to the money market
fund industry.  Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343,
§ 131(b), 122 Stat. 3765, 3797 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5236(b)) (2008) (“The Secretary is
prohibited from using the Exchange Stabilization Fund for the establishment of any future
guaranty programs for the United States money market mutual fund industry.”).  For a discus-
sion of the legal basis for Treasury’s guarantee in the first instance, see infra Part IV.B.  The
Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 eliminated the ability of the FDIC to create broad guarantee programs
such as the Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program (TLGP), absent joint congressional au-
thorization.  Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act),
Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1105(c)(1), 124 Stat. 1376, 2121 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C.
§§ 5612(d), 5613(a) (2010)); see infra note 116. R
9 Another possible answer, closely related to but distinct from moral hazard, is that
guarantees are costly and unfair, as they transfer wealth from taxpayers to undeserving risk
takers in private markets.  It is worth noting, however, that the guarantee programs did not, in
fact, cost the taxpayers money. See infra note 126 and accompanying text.  It is also worth R
observing that an unmitigated panic can cause significant damage to the real economy, injuring
innumerable innocent parties—hardly a “fair” outcome.  This creates what Timothy Geithner
calls the “paradox of financial crises: What feels just and fair is often the opposite of what’s
required for a just and fair outcome.” GEITHNER, supra note 1, at 505. R
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risk for the largest, “too big to fail” financial firms.10  Firms that enjoy
implicit or explicit government guarantees are not, then, penalized in
capital markets for taking on more risk, and thus have an incentive to
assume too much risk in pursuit of profit.  The logic of eliminating free-
standing guarantee authorities is that by tying regulators’ hands, Con-
gress yanks the safety net away and forces creditors to protect
themselves.  By protecting themselves, creditors will, the argument goes,
discipline large financial institutions.11
Some view the elimination of free-standing guarantee authorities as
a mistake, believing their value in halting panics exceeds the marginal
cost of moral hazard (which can potentially be contained through appro-
priate regulation).12  This Article makes a stronger claim: the moral haz-
ard cost that provides a plausible policy justification for prohibiting
regulators from issuing guarantees may not be a (net) cost at all.  If free-
standing guarantee authorities do not, on balance, exacerbate moral haz-
ard, it is hard to justify their absence from regulators’ crisis-response
toolkit.
This Article makes two broad claims in support of this argument.
First, there are significant vulnerabilities that persist in the financial sys-
tem that could make regulators justifiably anxious about imposing losses
on creditors in stressed markets.13  Second, regulators’ toolkit is not
empty.  I will describe a number of tools that regulators can use to save
individual financial firms or prevent losses to their creditors, thereby po-
tentially preventing a panic, but that are unequal to saving the system in
the event of a full-blown crisis.14
How might these facts translate into greater moral hazard in the ab-
sence of guarantee authorities?  If guarantee authorities are “strong” cri-
sis-response tools, then the authorities that permit targeted interventions
are “weak” tools.  Fearing a panic, and lacking a strong tool to contain
10 See, e.g., Viral V. Acharya et al., The End of Market Discipline? Investor Expectations
of Implicit Government Guarantees (John Templeton Found. & World Bank, Working Paper,
2014), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1961656 (finding that bond credit
spreads are sensitive to risk for most financial institutions, but not for the largest institutions).
11 It is worth noting that Congress gave regulators a few new tools in addition to elimi-
nating several old ones.  Most notably, they empowered regulators to resolve a failed systemi-
cally important financial institution outside of bankruptcy, aiming to avoid the dilemma
regulators faced repeatedly in 2008 of bailing out an institution or risking a panic.  This is the
“Orderly Liquidation Authority” created by Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act.  Dodd-Frank Act
§§ 201–217.  For a description of the resolution strategy regulators are poised to adopt pursu-
ant to this authority, see infra Part III.A.  For a discussion of the strategy’s virtues and limits,
see John Crawford, “Single Point of Entry”: The Promise and Limits of the Latest Cure for
Bailouts, 109 NW. U. L. REV. ONLINE 103 (2014), http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.
edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1006&context=nulr_online.
12 See infra Part I.A.
13 See infra Part II.
14 See infra Part III.A.
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one should it start, regulators will more frequently resort to weak tools in
order to try to prevent a fragile system from descending into chaos.
Sometimes this will be the right choice, but sometimes they may save a
firm or protect creditors when failure or losses would not have triggered
a panic and may have had salutary effects on market discipline.15
In order to frame the theoretical discussion with a concrete example
of the importance of guarantee authorities, Part I of this Article recounts
the fallout from Lehman Brothers’ failure in September 2008.  It then
provides an overview of enacted reforms and reform proposals in the
wake of the crisis, and of how the arguments of this piece fit into the
literature.  The arguments put forward here are consistent with the view
of those who believe a financial safety net in the form of guarantee au-
thorities, particularly when paired with other regulatory tools for address-
ing moral hazard, is cost-justified.  They support this view in a novel
way, however, by showing how the purported cost of this approach,
holding all else equal in the current system, may not be a (net) cost at all.
Part II explores lingering vulnerabilities in the financial system that
could, in the absence of government intervention, lead to damaging cri-
ses.  Part III details the “weak” tools regulators can use to bail out spe-
cific firms or their creditors, and describes the conditions under which
the existence of these tools in the absence of guarantee authorities could
exacerbate moral hazard.  Part IV responds to potential questions and
objections.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Panic16
On September 15, 2008, Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy.  On
September 16, Reserve Primary, a $63 billion money market fund
(MMF), reported a net asset value below $1.00 per share, “breaking the
buck,” as the result of its exposure to Lehman commercial paper.17
MMF shareholders, who can withdraw their investments on demand,
treat their MMF holdings like bank customers treat their deposits;
“breaking the buck” was the equivalent of telling depositors they cannot
15 A financial firm’s failure may trigger a crisis if the system is vulnerable enough.  If the
system is sufficiently stable, however, a large financial firm can fail without destabilizing the
system. See, e.g., Joseph H. Sommer, Why Bail-In? And How!, 20 ECON. POL’Y REV. 207, 214
(2014) (“[F]inancial firms often collapse in isolation, even large firms.  They still go down
quickly, but they go down smoothly.  Enron is one example; others are Barings Bank, Drexel
Burnham Lambert, Refco, MF Global, and Amaranth Advisors.”).  The problem is that when
the system is stressed, regulators lack a transparent view into how vulnerable the system is.
See infra note 149. R
16 Unless otherwise noted, this account of the aftermath of Lehman Brothers’ failure is
drawn from FCIC REPORT, supra note 3, at ch. 20. R
17 Commercial paper is a type of unsecured, short-term debt.
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have all their money back.  A massive “run” immediately began on the
multi-trillion-dollar MMF industry.18  Though it occurred in a very dif-
ferent institutional setting, the run was structurally identical to the bank
runs of the Great Depression, in which panicked depositors formed long
lines waiting to withdraw their savings from their local bank branch.
MMF investors demanded their money back en masse, but the MMFs
had not, of course, stashed investors’ money in a vault; they had invested
it in assets that had average maturities of several months and extremely
limited secondary markets.19  The MMFs could not turn their assets into
cash quickly enough to meet withdrawal demands.  Furthermore, as a
result of the run, MMFs stopped buying the commercial paper of large
corporations, threatening extraordinary disruption to the financial system
and the real economy.20  It is hard to overstate the damage the run would
have caused if left unabated.  As one insider at the Federal Reserve ex-
plained, “It was overwhelmingly clear that we were staring into the
abyss . . . . The overwhelming sense was that this was a catastrophe that
we were watching unfold.”21
As Secretary of the Treasury Hank Paulson tried to determine how
to keep the financial system from imploding, an aide suggested ex-
tending Federal Reserve lending programs to MMFs.  Paulson rejected
this as unequal to stopping the run.  “If anything,” he later wrote in his
memoirs, “a money fund borrowing from the Fed[eral Reserve] would be
stigmatized and suffer even more withdrawals.”22  The aide then sug-
gested guaranteeing MMFs, with the federal government ensuring MMF
shareholders their $1.00 per share.  Paulson, surprised, asked “Could
we?” and the aide replied, “I think so.”23  “Paulson slammed his hand
down on his desk.  ‘Then that’s what we’re going to do.’  A few partici-
pants were aghast. . . . [A]nother cornerstone of moral hazard was being
removed.  But others argued that the risk of not doing anything, or of
doing too little, was far worse.”24
Paulson later echoed the view of most commentators in crediting the
guarantee—which never had to pay out a dollar and collected more than
18 The run was concentrated on a particular type of MMF: MMFs whose investors were
primarily institutions rather than retail customers, and which invested in the debt of private
companies, as distinct from government debt.  For a more detailed account, see infra Part II.A.
19 See supra note 18.  MMFs that invested in Treasury securities do not, of course, face R
the same lack of liquid secondary markets for their investments.
20 For example, many large corporations issued commercial paper in order to meet near-
term commitments such as payroll.
21 FCIC REPORT, supra note 3, at 357. R
22 HENRY M. PAULSON, JR., ON THE BRINK: INSIDE THE RACE TO STOP THE COLLAPSE OF
THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM 252 (2010).
23 James B. Stewart, Eight Days: The Battle to Save the American Financial System,
NEW YORKER (Sept. 21, 2009), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2009/09/21/eight-days.
24 Id.
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$1 billion in premium payments—with holding the system together dur-
ing this period.25  Concerns over moral hazard, however, led Congress to
eliminate the legal authority for the guarantee when it passed the Emer-
gency Economic Stabilization Act (EESA) a few weeks later.26
It is worth pausing to consider the potential impact the repeal of this
authority might have on regulatory incentives.  Larry Summers, Treasury
Secretary during the Clinton administration and later the Director of
President Obama’s National Economic Council, remarked, “It is difficult
to see how any prudent policy maker, after witnessing the Armageddon
that followed the collapse of Lehman, could have failed to take steps to
prevent further collapses.”27  Even with the guarantee, the situation was
dire; without the guarantee, it would have been a cataclysm.  Stripped of
the guarantee authority, regulators should be even less willing to watch
passively as a financial behemoth totters on the edge of failure.28
B. Financial Reform and Moral Hazard
Concerns over moral hazard have underlain many, if not most, of
enacted reforms, proposed reforms, and general critiques of the regula-
tory system since the crisis.29  At one end of the spectrum, some observ-
ers argue that all regulatory intervention in the financial system, not just
bailouts, exacerbates moral hazard and is counterproductive: if regulators
would just get out of the way, the market would ensure just, efficient
outcomes.30  Most observers, however, find this position unpersuasive
25 PAULSON, supra note 22, at 263 (“[The program] was, I believe, the single most pow- R
erful and important action taken to hold the system together before Congress acted.”).
26 See supra note 8. R
27 Lawrence Summers, Lawrence Summers on ‘House of Debt,’ FIN. TIMES (June 6,
2014), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/3ec604c0-ec96-11e3-8963-00144feabdc0.html.
28 This may be offset somewhat by the Orderly Liquidation Authority created by Dodd-
Frank. See supra note 11. R
29 Most actual reforms since the crisis have been implemented by rules written pursuant
to Dodd-Frank.  It is worth observing that Dodd-Frank is 848 pages long, but, as The Econo-
mist noted in 2012, “that is only the beginning”: most of the statute does not directly create
new rules, but rather directs regulatory agencies to write rules. The Dodd-Frank Act: Too Big
Not to Fail, ECONOMIST (Feb. 18, 2012), http://www.economist.com/node/21547784.  The
rule-writing process is ongoing: Dodd-Frank mandates an estimated 395 new rules, but as of
the end of 2014, only 231 had been finalized. See Dodd-Frank Progress Report, Fourth Quar-
ter 2014, DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL (Jan. 1, 2015), http://www.davispolk.com/sites/default/
files/Q4_2014_Dodd-Frank_Progress_Report.PDF.  Some notable aspects of Dodd-Frank in-
clude the creation of a “Financial Stability Oversight Council,” which can, inter alia, designate
non-bank financial companies as “systemically important,” subjecting them to prudential su-
pervision by the Federal Reserve (Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §§ 111, 113, 124 Stat. 1376, 1392, 1398 (2010); Dodd-Frank Act
§§ 201–217); the provision for regulation and supervision of previously unregulated swap
markets, Dodd-Frank Title VII (Dodd-Frank Act §§ 701–774); and the “Volcker Rule,” limit-
ing proprietary trading by banks and bank affiliates (Dodd-Frank Act § 619).
30 See, e.g., John A. Allison, Market Discipline Beats Regulatory Discipline, 34 CATO J.
345, 345–51 (2014), http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/cato-journal/2014/5/
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due to market failures in preventing panics, along with the significant
negative externalities that follow from panics.31  The more common ap-
proach, then, seeks to use regulation either to make failure less damaging
when it occurs,32 or to make failure less likely to occur in the first place.
Approaches that focus on reducing the likelihood of failure include direct
regulation of what banks may do and invest in33 or of how much capital
financial institutions must hold,34 as well as efforts to recalibrate the in-
centive structures of various parties—including shareholders,35 manag-
ers,36 creditors,37 and regulators themselves38—whose decisions could
make failure more or less likely.  However, relatively few reform propos-
cato-journal-v34n2-9.pdf (“I can tell you with absolute certainty that market discipline beats
regulatory discipline.  In fact, . . . regulatory discipline will always fail to reduce volatility and
will slow economic growth. . . . I would get rid of government deposit insurance. . . . I would
get rid of the Federal Reserve . . . .”).
31 See, e.g., Morgan Ricks, Regulating Money Creation After the Crisis, 1 HARV. BUS. L.
REV. 75, 103–21 (2011).
32 The forthcoming rules that aim to make orderly resolution of financial behemoths
feasible are a good example of this. See Crawford, supra note 11. But see Kenneth Ayotte & R
David A. Skeel, Jr., Bankruptcy or Bailouts?, 35 J. CORP. L. 469, 471 (2010) (arguing that
bankruptcy should be the preferred option dealing with failed SIFIs, and that “[t]he rescue loan
approach favored in the financial crisis increased uncertainty, increased the costs of moral
hazard, and dampened the incentive of private actors to resolve distress before a desperate ‘day
of reckoning’ arose”).
33 See, e.g., Prohibitions and Restrictions on Proprietary Trading and Certain Interests in,
and Relationships with, Hedge Funds and Private Equity Funds (Volcker Rule), 79 Fed. Reg.
5808 (Jan. 31, 2014) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 75); see also Eric A. Posner & E. Glen Weyl,
An FDA for Financial Innovation: Applying the Insurable Interest Doctrine to Twenty-First-
Century Financial Markets, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 1307, 1307 (2013) (proposing “that when
firms invent new financial products, they be forbidden to sell them until they receive approval
from a government agency designed along the lines of the FDA”).
34 See, e.g., Risk-Based Capital Guidelines: Implementation of Capital Requirements for
Global Systemically Important Bank Holding Companies, 79 Fed. Reg. 75,473 (proposed Dec.
18, 2014) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 217); see also ANAT ADMATI & MARTIN HELLWIG, THE
BANKERS’ NEW CLOTHES: WHAT’S WRONG WITH BANKING AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT
(2011) (calling for significantly higher capital requirements).
35 See, e.g., Peter Conti-Brown, Elective Shareholder Liability, 64 STAN. L. REV. 409,
412–13 (2012) (proposing to force shareholders of systemically important financial institutions
to elect a regime of significantly higher capital, or relinquish their limited liability).
36 See, e.g., Shareholder Approval of Executive Compensation and Golden Parachute
Compensation, 76 Fed. Reg. 6010 (Feb. 2, 2011) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 229, 240 & 249);
Lucian A. Bebchuk & Holger Spamann, Regulating Bankers’ Pay, 98 GEO. L.J. 247, 249
(2010) (arguing for new compensation schemes to make executives more sensitive to down-
side risk).
37 See, e.g., Adequacy of Loss-Absorbing Capacity of Global Systemically Important
Banks in Resolution, FIN. STABILIT BD. 6 (Nov. 10, 2014), http://www.financialstabilityboard
.org/wp-content/uploads/TLAC-Condoc-6-Nov-2014-FINAL.pdf (proposing standards for “to-
tal loss-absorbing capacity” for SIFIs, with the aim of creating at least one class of debt for
even the largest financial firms that regulators can credibly threaten with losses); Mark J. Roe,
The Derivatives Market’s Payment Priorities as Financial Crisis Accelerator, 63 STAN. L.
REV. 539, 542 (2011) (arguing that the repayment priority extremely short-term “repo” lenders
receive in bankruptcy weakens their incentive to monitor and thus impose market discipline on
financial firms).
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als affirmatively promote a regime that would save insolvent firms or
their creditors.39
Even the few who argue that the economic fallout of an unmitigated
financial crisis counsels against letting the system burn, and, rather, calls
for guarantee powers combined with some type of (potentially quite on-
erous) regulation to control the moral hazard costs of a guarantee regime,
admit that moral hazard is a significant cost of such a regime.40  They
acknowledge a trade-off between the economic damage from a panic and
the moral hazard costs of bailouts.
This Article does not contradict the trade-off view, but argues that
denying regulators strong crisis-response tools that can underwrite entire
markets in extremis can make a resort to weak tools in the form of firm-
specific interventions more likely, potentially leading to a net increase in
moral hazard costs.  This Article bolsters the arguments in favor of re-
storing guarantee authorities by showing that their moral hazard effects
are, in fact, ambiguous.
II. VULNERABILITIES: PAST AND PRESENT
The key systemic vulnerabilities that justify a broader safety net
arise from both banking and “shadow banking” activities.41  Shadow
banking refers to the migration of traditional bank functions away from
38 See, e.g., M. Todd Henderson & Frederick Tung, Pay for Regulator Performance, 85
S. CAL. L. REV. 1003 (2012) (proposing to link regulator compensation to the downside risk of
the firms they regulate in order to increase regulators’ diligence).
39 The exceptions to the anti-bailout stance tend to argue that bailouts are necessary evils
and (in any event) likely to continue—so the best course is to formalize the process and limit
the costs. See, e.g., Morgan Ricks, A Regulatory Design for Monetary Stability, 65 VAND. L.
REV. 1289 (2012) [hereinafter Regulatory Design] (proposing insurance for all short-term,
deposit-like debt, along with severe restrictions on which firms may issue such debt); Jeffrey
N. Gordon & Christopher Muller, Confronting Financial Crisis: Dodd-Frank’s Dangers and
the Case for a Systemic Emergency Insurance Fund, 28 YALE J. ON REG. 151 (2011) (propos-
ing a trillion-dollar insurance fund to inject capital into financial firms upon a consensus deter-
mination of a systemic crisis by financial regulators); Stephen J. Lubben, OLA After Single
Point of Entry: Has Anything Changed?, in AN UNFINISHED MISSION: MAKING WALL STREET
WORK FOR US 13, 17–18 (Mike Konczal & Marcus Stanley eds., 2013) (“It’s relatively easy to
rail against ‘moral hazard’ in the abstract, and say that large financial institutions should be left
to face ‘market forces,’ such as insolvency and liquidation.  But the financial system exists so
that those with money can lend that money to those who need it, and there are real conse-
quences of allowing that system to fall apart. . . . In the face of those real consequences, it is
probably best to acknowledge that large financial institutions will be bailed out in some cir-
cumstances.  Probably the better goal is to make sure that those bailouts are paid for in ad-
vance, by the entities that are most likely to need them.”).
40 See, e.g., Regulatory Design, supra note 39. R
41 See Pedro Nicolaci da Costa & Ryan Tracy, As Fed Shines Light on Shadow Banking,
Its Regulatory Limits Get Laid Bare, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 21, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/arti
cles/as-fed-shines-light-on-shadow-banking-its-regulatory-limits-get-laid-bare-1419193684
(observing that by some measures, the shadow banking system in the United States is even
larger than the traditional banking system).
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the regulatory framework that applies to commercial banks.  The vulner-
abilities of both banks and shadow banks are rooted in their issuance of
short-term debt treated by the debt holders as a type of money—that is,
an asset they can use directly (as with checking accounts) or indirectly
(as with savings accounts that permit withdrawals on demand) to transact
for anticipated goods and services in the near term.42  This short-term
debt consists of deposits and deposit-like debt.  Banks and shadow-banks
then use a large portion of the funds raised by issuing deposits and de-
posit-like debt to invest in longer-term assets, which cannot necessarily
be turned into cash quickly and for full value, particularly during times
of stress.43  These twin functions provide a valuable service to depositors
and deposit-like creditors and expand funds available to lend to
creditworthy consumers and businesses, but they give rise to serious
risks as well.  Above all, absent a government safety net, they create the
risk of a run on the institution if creditors grow anxious that if they wait
they will not be able to access their full principal immediately upon ma-
turity.  Indeed, a bank facing a run without a safety net must generally
sell assets at a loss or suspend redemptions, or both.
A bank failure with no safety net is always damaging.  At a mini-
mum, depositors’ inability to access cash when they need it can lead to
consequential losses that range from the irritating to the devastating.44
Such a failure in a stressed market may also spark a panic if depositors at
similarly situated banks start to run.45
Of course, there is a safety net for commercial banks and their de-
positors: they can borrow from the Federal Reserve’s discount window
and their deposits are insured—up to a limit of $250,000 ($100,000
heading into the crisis)—by the federal government.46  The FDIC can
also make uninsured creditors whole by invoking the “systemic risk ex-
ception” to the requirement that it pursue a resolution strategy that will
create the “least cost” to the deposit insurance fund.47  This safety net
was a cornerstone of a financial regulatory system that managed to pre-
42 See Ricks, supra note 31, at 91. R
43 Indeed, one of the defining features of a financial crisis is the utter desiccation of
markets that are extremely liquid in normal times.
44 See Ricks, supra note 31, at 83. R
45 This “contagion by simile” is just one possible mechanism of loss propagation in a
crisis; others include counterparty losses, monetary contraction, and a credit crunch.  For an
account of these and of how they can amplify initial losses, see John Crawford, Wargaming
Financial Crises: The Problem of (In)experience and Regulator Expertise, REV. BANKING &
FIN. L. 111, 131–41 (2014).
46 For a description of the discount window, see Discount Window Lending, FED. RE-
SERVE SYS., http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/reform_discount_window.htm (last
visited Nov. 16, 2015).  For a description of federal deposit insurance, see Your Insured De-
posits, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., https://www.fdic.gov/deposit/deposits/brochures/Your%20In
sured%20Deposits%20-%20English.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2015).
47 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)(G) (2012).
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vent a banking panic for 75 years, from the establishment of the FDIC in
1933 until the crisis hit with full force in 2008.48  As we will see, it was,
ultimately, not enough to protect commercial banks from the seeds of
contagion during the recent crisis.49  The heart of the crisis, however, lay
not among commercial banks but in the shadow banking system, which,
in addition to avoiding traditional bank regulation, operates without the
formal benefit of such a safety net.50
Narratives of the crisis and the government’s response often focus
on decisions with respect to specific institutions: Bear Stearns, Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac, Lehman Brothers, and AIG.51  At key points in
September and October 2008, however, regulators realized that the con-
siderable arsenal of tools and interventions they were employing were no
longer enough to hold the system together.  The arsenal up to that point
included interest rate cuts and emergency lending to non-banks by the
Federal Reserve.  It also included targeted interventions such as facilitat-
ing the sale of Bear Stearns, invoking the “systemic risk exception” to
the FDIC’s “least cost” requirement in resolving the giant commercial
bank Wachovia, and seizing (and guaranteeing the debts of) Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac, the government-sponsored, but (until September 2008)
formally private, guarantors of the majority of American mortgages.52
Recognizing the inadequacy of emergency lending facilities and ad
hoc, firm-specific bailouts to the growing magnitude of the crisis, regula-
tors made several key moves in the fall of 2008.  They guaranteed tril-
lions of dollars of previously uninsured financial liabilities,53 and went to
Congress to ask for authority to inject capital directly into financial insti-
tutions.  Congress provided this with the Emergency Economic Stabiliza-
tion Act (EESA).54
48 This span is sometimes referred to as “The Quiet Period.” See GARY B. GORTON,
MISUNDERSTANDING FINANCIAL CRISES: WHY WE DON’T SEE THEM COMING 4 (2012) [herein-
after GORTON, MISUNDERSTANDING FINANCIAL CRISES] (measuring “The Quiet Period” a bit
more stringently as lasting from 1934 until 2007).  It is worth observing that the savings and
loan crisis of the 1980s created large losses for taxpayers, but did not involve a financial panic
or bank run.  For a good account of the savings and loan crisis, see LAWRENCE J. WHITE, THE
S&L DEBACLE: PUBLIC POLICY LESSONS FOR BANK AND THRIFT REGULATION (1991).
49 See infra Part II.C.
50 The safety net was, however, extended on an ad hoc basis to the shadow banking
system in 2008 in order to contain the crisis.  For an account of the extension of the safety net
to shadow banks, see generally DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL LLP, FINANCIAL CRISIS MANUAL:
A GUIDE TO THE LAWS, REGULATIONS AND CONTRACTS OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS (2009)
[hereinafter FINANCIAL CRISIS MANUAL].
51 For a good first-person account touching on each of these, see PAULSON, supra note
22. R
52 See generally FCIC REPORT, supra note 3; FINANCIAL CRISIS MANUAL, supra note 50. R
53 These guarantees extended to MMF accounts, uninsured bank deposits, and long-term
debt of banks and bank-holding companies. See infra Part II.A–C.
54 Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765.
The initial capital injections were into the largest, systemically important financial institutions,
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After voting down the original version of the EESA,55 Congress
eventually enacted a new version on October 3, 2008, 13 days after the
proposed legislation was announced by the Bush administration.56
EESA’s enactment was breathtakingly fast by normal congressional stan-
dards, but fatally slow by the standards of financial markets.  As noted
above, without the MMF guarantee, the economic damage during this
period would have been significantly worse.57
The landscape has, however, changed significantly since 2008; sig-
nificant reforms have been implemented and the system is in many ways
more stable.  It is worth asking, then, whether the vulnerabilities that
required the use of guarantee authorities in 2008 persist today.58  This
Part examines different areas of potential vulnerability, concluding that
the loci of the crisis in 2008 have not, in fact, been “panic-proofed.”
There is cause for concern, then, about the wisdom of stripping regula-
tors of guarantee authorities, their greatest panic-fighting tool.
A. Vulnerability 1: Money Market Funds59
A money market fund (MMF) is a type of mutual fund that serves
for its “shareholders” as a close substitute for bank accounts.  A “share”
of an MMF is never supposed to dip below $1.00 in value, in the same
way that depositors do not expect to lose any of the nominal principal in
their bank accounts.  Further, much like demand deposits, MMF ac-
counts can be drawn down at will.  MMFs engage in (a bit of) maturity
but many non-systemically important institutions ultimately participated as well. See FINAN-
CIAL CRISIS MANUAL, supra note 50, at ch. 3. R
55 See Alison Vekshin & Laura Litvan, U.S. House Rejects $700 Billion Financial-Res-
cue Plan, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 29, 2008), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=news
archive&sid=aeqvQcX6sRe4.
56 See David M. Herszenhorn, Bailout Plan Wins Approval; Democrats Vow Tighter
Rules, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 3, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/04/business/economy/
04bailout.html.  The initial proposal for the legislation was announced on September 20, 2008.
See Text of Draft Proposal for Bailout Plan, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 20, 2008), http://
www.nytimes.com/2008/09/21/business/21draftcnd.html.
57 See supra Part I.A.
58 In a recent opinion piece, Glenn Hubbard and Hal Scott decry the post-crisis limita-
tions placed on regulatory authority with respect to both guarantees and lending.  Glenn Hub-
bard & Hal Scott, A Financial System Still Dangerously Vulnerable to a Panic, WALL ST. J.
(Mar. 1, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/glenn-hubbard-and-hal-scott-a-financial-system-
still-dangerously-vulnerable-to-a-panic-1425249064 (“Some claim there is nothing to worry
about because of new regulations to prevent another crisis: enhanced capital requirements, new
liquidity requirements and new resolution procedures.  This approach calls to mind a strategy
of two wings and a prayer.”).
59 For a description of money market funds, see generally Securities and Exchange
Commission, Money Market Funds (Jan. 16, 2013), http://www.sec.gov/answers/mfmmkt.htm.
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transformation by investing in short-term, high-quality debt of govern-
ments and private insurers.60
The MMF industry is significant: as of November 2015, MMFs ac-
counted for approximately $2.7 trillion in assets.61  MMFs play a central
role in the shadow-banking system, as they provide deposit-like services
to their “shareholders” while investing in (slightly) longer-term assets.62
At the same time, MMFs create potential risks similar to those of banks
in the era prior to the Federal Reserve and the FDIC.  MMFs are not,
however, subject to anything like the prudential supervision or capital
requirements that banks are subject to.  Moreover, MMFs do not benefit
from banks’ explicit safety net of deposit insurance or the Federal Re-
serve’s liquidity facilities.
It is worth observing that MMFs are formally like other mutual
funds in that fund “shareholders” do not have a contractual right to re-
ceive $1.00 per share, but rather only the per-share net asset value
(NAV) of the fund.  If the per-share NAV drops below $1.00 (thus
“breaking the buck”), the failure of an MMF to pay its shareholders
$1.00 per share does not technically constitute default, unlike the case of
a bank that fails to repay its depositors 100 cents on the dollar.  However,
unique accounting rules, along with a strong norm of sponsor support in
the face of fund losses, assure that MMFs virtually never “break the
buck.”63  Specifically, MMFs have traditionally been permitted to use
60 Money market funds (MMFs) arose in the 1970s as an alternative to bank deposit
accounts, and were initially attractive because banks faced a cap on the interest rates they were
permitted to pay depositors, while interest rates everywhere else in the economy were rising.
The first MMFs invested the funds raised from issuing “shares” in Treasury bills, and because
the interest on government debt was much higher than the maximum interest on deposits banks
were allowed to pay, the MMFs’ “shareholders” benefited from a higher return on their hold-
ings vis-a`-vis bank accounts while retaining many of the same attractive benefits of a bank
account, including liquidity, transaction services, and price stability.  MMFs soon emerged that
invested in high-quality debt other than Treasury bills.  MMFs with diversified portfolios in-
cluding private debt are referred to as prime MMFs.
61 Money Market Fund Assets, INV. CO. INST., https://www.ici.org/research/stats/mmf/
mm_11_05_15 (last visited Nov. 5, 2015).
62 MMFs are restricted to investments in relatively short-term securities (though much
longer term than the zero maturity status of the MMFs’ liabilities).  SEC § 270.2a-7 creates
two limits on the weighted average maturity of an MMF portfolio.  First, it cannot exceed 60
days, taking in account of a number of exceptions.  17 C.F.R. § 270.2a-7(c)(2)(ii) (2014); see,
e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 270.2a-7(d)(1) (noting that “[a] Government Security that is a Floating Rate
Security shall be deemed to have a remaining maturity of one day,” regardless of its actual
maturity).  Second, the weighted average maturity of an MMF portfolio cannot exceed 120
days, regardless of the exceptions that apply with respect to the 60-day limit.  17 C.F.R.
§ 270.2a-7(c)(2)(iii).
63 Sponsor support to prevent investor losses is the strong norm for MMFs in danger of
breaking the buck.  For example, one study showed that 29 MMFs suffered losses large
enough to break the buck in September and October 2008, but only Reserve Primary actually
broke the buck as the others all received sponsor support.  Patrick E. McCabe et al., The
Minimum Balance at Risk: A Proposal to Mitigate the Systemic Risks Posed by Money Market
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“amortized” accounting and penny rounding to maintain their $1.00 per-
share NAV.64  These accounting rules, however, help make runs an exis-
tential, if seemingly remote, threat to MMFs in the event a sponsor can-
not or will not step in to protect fund shareholders.  This is because
amortized accounting can create a discrepancy between the reported
NAV—which determines funds paid out per withdrawn share—and the
actual value of an MMF portfolio.  If investors perceive a gap, they will
have an incentive to redeem their shares before the reported NAV comes
into alignment with the (lower) true value.
September 2008. The run on MMFs in the wake of Lehman’s fail-
ure and Reserve Primary “breaking the buck” constituted, perhaps, the
most harrowing moment of the crisis.65  The Treasury’s response was to
guarantee MMFs with something called the Exchange Stabilization Fund
(ESF), established by the Gold Reserve Act of 1934 and intended for use
in stabilizing the value of the dollar vis-a`-vis other currencies.66  The
guarantee succeeded in halting the run, and, as described above, was
widely seen as “the single most powerful and important action taken to
hold the system together before Congress acted.”67  Despite this, the
EESA, as noted, specifically removed authority to use the ESF to guaran-
tee MMFs, and there is currently no plausible statutory basis for provid-
ing a similar sort of guarantee to the industry in future emergencies.
Reform Efforts Since 2008.  While the right side of MMF balance
sheets proved to be extraordinarily vulnerable during the crisis—with no
capital cushions and mostly runnable debt (even if formally termed
“shares”)—the left, or asset, side has always been highly regulated to
minimize the risk of loss.  SEC Rule 2a-7 under the Investment Com-
pany Act of 1940 contains a large number of prescriptive and proscrip-
Funds 29 (Fed. Res. Bank of N.Y., Staff Report No. 564, 2012), http://www.federalreserve.
gov/pubs/feds/2012/201247/201247pap.pdf.
64 The “Amortized Cost Method of valuation means the method of calculating an
[MMF’s] net asset value whereby portfolio securities are valued at the fund’s [a]cquisition cost
as adjusted for amortization of premium or accretion of discount rather than at their value
based on current market factors.”  17 C.F.R. § 270.2a-7(a)(2).  The “Penny-Rounding Method
of pricing means the method of computing an [MMF’s] price per share for purposes of distri-
bution, redemption and repurchase whereby the current net asset value per share is rounded to
the nearest one percent.”  17 C.F.R. § 270.2a-7(a)(20).
65 For a description of the run and the government’s response, see supra Introduction.
66 Gold Reserve Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73–87, 48 Stat. 337.  For a discussion of the
(controversial) legal grounding for this use of the ESF, see infra Part IV.A.  It is also worth
noting that Paulson’s team’s initial plan had a fatal flaw: providing an unlimited guarantee to
all MMF accounts would almost certainly create a run on uninsured deposits in the commercial
banking system, as large depositors sought greater safety combined with the slightly higher
returns offered by MMFs.  Sheila Bair, the chairwoman of the FDIC at the time, apprised
Paulson of the problem and proposed a solution that was eventually adopted: guaranteeing
only existing MMF account balances. See PAULSON, supra note 22, at 262. R
67 PAULSON, supra note 22, at 263. R
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tive guidelines for MMF investments.68  In 2010, prior to the passage of
Dodd-Frank, the SEC amended Rule 2a-7 to strengthen the risk profile of
MMF portfolios even further,69 and added a new rule permitting MMF
boards of directors to suspend redemptions and liquidate the MMF if its
per-share NAV “may result in material dilution”—that is, breaks the
buck.70
The SEC finalized further reforms in 2014, aimed more squarely at
the risk MMFs face of a run.71  These reforms, however, fall short of
solving the fundamental vulnerability of MMFs.  The new rules adopt
two basic approaches to addressing MMF vulnerability, both of which
apply only to sections of the industry.  The first forces institutional prime
MMFs to adopt a “floating” NAV. Prime MMFs, unlike government
MMFs,72 have diverse portfolios that generally include private issuer
debt.73 Institutional MMFs are distinct from retail MMFs in that they
include (often exclusively) institutional investors among their
shareholders.
The idea behind the floating NAV requirement—which requires a
greater degree of accounting for assets at current market value rather
than according to amortized cost—is that it will train MMF investors to
accept that the per-share NAV could fluctuate, and will remove the in-
68 17 C.F.R. § 270.2a-7.
69 See Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Approves Money Market Fund Re-
forms to Better Protect Investors (Jan. 27, 2010), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-
14.htm.
70 17 C.F.R. § 270.22e-3.
71 Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Adopts Money Market Fund Reform
Rules (July 23, 2014), http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/13705423
47679#.VNk-_010yRs.  The reform came after a fraught, tortuous process.  Immediately after
Dodd-Frank, more fundamental reforms were considered, but in August 2012, after failing to
get a majority of commissioners on board with meaningful reform, SEC Chairman Mary
Schapiro announced that the Commission would not propose new rules to address the struc-
tural problems of MMFs. See Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Statement of SEC Chair-
man Mary L. Schapiro on Money Market Fund Reform (Aug. 22, 2012), http://www.sec.gov/
News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1365171484078#.VNk_lC7K9_A.  Several months
later, pursuant to Dodd-Frank Act § 120, the Financial Stability Oversight Council prepared a
recommendation that the SEC proceed with MMF reform nonetheless. FINANCIAL STABILITY
OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, PROPOSED RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING MONEY MARKET MUTUAL
FUND REFORM (2012) [hereinafter FSOC REPORT], http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/
Documents/Proposed%20Recommendations%20Regarding%20Money%20Market%20Mutual
%20Fund%20Reform%20-%20November%2013,%202012.pdf.
72 Money Market Fund Reform; Amendments to Form PF, 79 Fed. Reg. 47,736, 47,791
(Aug. 14, 2014) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230, 239, 270, 274, 279) (defining govern-
ment money market funds under the new rules as funds  that “invest[ ] at least 99.5% of [their]
total assets in cash, government securities, and/or repurchase agreements that are ‘collateral-
ized fully’ (i.e., collateralized by cash or government securities)” and encompass Treasury
money market funds, which invest solely in U.S. Treasury securities or in repo agreements
collateralized by U.S. Treasury securities).
73 Id. at 47,738 (including “[t]ax-exempt funds,” which invest primarily in municipal
debt, in the SEC definition of “Prime MMF”).
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centive to be first to withdraw—the primary motivation in a run—by
eliminating any discrepancies between MMFs’ reported NAV and actual
asset value.
Unfortunately, the new rules do not eliminate the risk of a run on
institutional prime MMFs, as shareholders may still perceive a gap be-
tween the reported NAV (even though it is technically “floating”) and
the market value of the MMF’s underlying portfolio.  The perception of a
gap incentivizes investors to withdraw before the gap closes—i.e., before
the reported NAV reflects the (less rosy) reality.  The perception of a gap
could arise from at least two sources.  First, MMFs may still take advan-
tage of the general rule for mutual funds that permits amortized cost ac-
counting for assets with a maturity of less than 60 days.74  The second,
more difficult problem is the illiquidity of the typical prime MMF’s as-
sets, the majority of which are commercial paper and certificates of de-
posit.75  Although the valuation of these securities must be determined in
good faith by the MMF board, valuing illiquid instruments inevitably
involves a significant degree of discretionary judgment, which could, in a
crisis, lead MMF investors to believe that being first in the queue to
redeem their shares will (despite the floating NAV) assure them a higher
recovery than those whose redemption demands arrive after the fund has
been “forced to meet [such] demands by selling assets that have not yet
matured.”76
Even aside from the lingering possibility of perceived gaps between
the reported and the true NAV, imposing a floating NAV on (some)
MMFs is problematic.  MMF shares have served as a money substitute
precisely because of their liquidity and price stability; if price stability is
successfully eliminated, it would, as Jill Fisch has observed, “substan-
tially reduce the utility of MMFs for many investors, which could, in
turn, affect the availability of short-term credit.”77  Another possible con-
74 See Squam Lake Group, SEC Comment Letter, No. S7-03-13, 2 n.2, (Sept. 17, 2013)
[hereinafter Squam Lake Group Comment Letter], https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-03-13/
s70313-198.pdf (observing that “[a]lthough the SEC has indicated that funds are supposed to
use fair value where it is less than amortized cost, we believe that this provision effectively
makes amortized cost the default option and provides a degree of discretion to fund managers
that is unwarranted”); see also Money Market Fund Reform; Amendments to Form PF, 79
Fed. Reg. at 47,812 (stating that “floating NAV money market funds . . . may . . . continue to
use amortized cost to value debt securities with remaining maturities of 60 days or less if fund
directors, in good faith, determine that the fair value of their debt securities is their amortized
cost value, unless the particular circumstances warrant otherwise”).
75 Squam Lake Group Comment Letter, supra note 74, at 2–3 (“These assets have ex- R
tremely limited secondary markets and an average maturity well in excess of the period over
which a run would occur.”).
76 Id. at 3.
77 Jill E. Fisch, The Broken Buck Stops Here: Embracing Sponsor Support in Money
Market Fund Reform, 93 N.C. L. REV. 935, 935 (2015) (making a strong case for requiring
sponsor support for MMFs, but questioning whether it is worth noting that the run on MMFs in
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sequence is that the reduced utility of institutional prime MMFs will,
rather than reducing short-term credit in the economy, push institutional
investors to seek money substitutes in other, potentially less regulated,
corners of the shadow banking system.78
A second major element of the recently finalized MMF rules re-
quires “gates and fees” at all prime funds, retail and institutional,79 in
order to limit the damage of a panic after it has begun.  The rule would
require prime MMFs to impose liquidity fees and withdrawal restrictions
(or “gates”) in the event of a run on the fund.  (Government MMFs will
be able to opt into the regime of fees and gates, as long as they disclose
this to investors ex ante.)  Both fees and gates will be triggered if the
fund’s “weekly liquid assets” fall below a certain threshold.  Weekly liq-
uid assets are defined to include “cash, U.S. Treasury securities, certain
other Government securities with remaining maturities of 60 days or less,
or securities that convert into cash within one week.”80  If the fund’s
weekly liquid assets fall below thirty percent of its total assets, the fund’s
board of directors may, in its discretion (after finding it would be in the
fund’s best interest), impose a fee of up to two percent on further with-
drawals, and temporarily suspend further redemptions for up to ten days.
If the fund’s weekly liquid assets fall below ten percent of total assets,
the fund is required to impose a withdrawal fee of one percent, unless the
2008 was not triggered by sponsors’ unwillingness to support their funds). See generally Mc-
Cabe et al., supra note 63, at 5.  For a good pre´cis of the research on sponsor support, see R
Marco Cipriani et al., Twenty-Eight Money Market Funds that Could Have Broken the Buck:
New Data on Losses During the 2008 Crisis, LIBERTY ST. ECON. (Oct. 9, 2013), http://liberty
streeteconomics.newyorkfed.org/2013/10/twenty-eight-money-market-funds-that-could-have-
broken-the-buck-new-data-on-losses-during-the-2008-c.html#.VNlD8y7K9_A (“In a 2010 re-
port, Moody’s found 144 cases in which U.S. MMFs received support from sponsors between
1989 and 2003.  Brady, Anadu, and Cooper (2012) documented 123 instances of support for
seventy-eight different MMFs between 2007 and 2011, including thirty-one cases in which
support was large enough that it probably was needed to prevent funds from breaking the
buck. . . . [W]hat made Reserve Primary Fund unique in 2008 was neither its exposure to
Lehman Brothers nor its portfolio losses, but the fact that its sponsor could not absorb its
losses.”).  In the end, therefore, it is not clear that concerns over the willingness of sponsors to
support their funds would, as the industry is currently structured, be a greater trigger for runs
than concerns over sponsors’ ability to support their funds.
78 Bruce Tuckman, Federal Liquidity Options: Containing Runs on Deposit-Like Assets
Without Bailouts and Moral Hazard 9 (Center for Financial Stability, Policy Paper, 2012),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2018873 (describing the strong demand
for money-like assets and observing that “reducing the attractiveness of money market funds
to institutional cash pools will almost certainly result in a rush to satisfy this demand in other
ways, including ‘less regulated or unregulated cash management vehicles’”).
79 See Money Market Fund Reform; Amendments to Form PF, 79 Fed. Reg. at 47,794
(defining a retail money market fund as “a money market fund that has policies and procedures
reasonably designed to limit all beneficial owners of the [money market] fund to natural
persons”).
80 Id. at 47,745 n.84.
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board makes a specific finding that a higher or lower (or no) fee would
be in the fund’s best interest.81
These gates and fees could help prevent the destructive liquidation
of an MMF in a panic, but it could also exacerbate the early stages of a
run, as gates or fees imposed at one MMF could inspire investors in other
MMFs to run to try to withdraw all they can before the “weekly liquid
asset” threshold at their fund is triggered.  Further, if we recall that inves-
tors in money markets care above all about immediate access to their full
principal, it becomes clear that gates and fees, though preferable to an
unfettered run, may impose considerable consequential damage on those
investors who cannot access funds they thought would be immediately
available to them.82
A final point is that while government MMFs can opt into a regime
of gates and fees, their general exemption from these reforms appears to
reflect a belief that they are run-proof.  Contrary to this view, the Finan-
cial Stability Oversight Council, in its “recommendations” on MMF re-
form in the face of SEC inertia in 2012, stated that “[g]overnment MMFs
. . . may pose the same structural risks [as prime MMFs], in that the
funds’ investors would have an incentive to redeem if they feared even
small losses.”83  It bolsters this position by pointing to specific instances
that suggest vulnerability for government MMFs.84
B. Vulnerability 2: Broker-Dealers
Broker-dealers85 were a central pillar in the shadow banking system
leading up to the crisis.  Like banks, the largest broker-dealers invested
in longer-term assets, and financed these assets largely with runnable,
deposit-like debt.  Although commonly referred to as “investment
banks,” they were subject to nothing like the prudential regulation to
81 See id. at 47,757–58.
82 See Ricks, supra note 31, at 83 (“[B]ecause money-claims [such as money market R
shares] are held for instrumental purposes, their defaults cause consequential losses to their
holders—opportunity costs, operational disruption, reputational damage, or even default.
(Critically, these losses are distinct from, and might far exceed, any investment losses that their
holders may experience.)”).
83 FSOC REPORT, supra note 71, at 26. R
84 Id. (describing the large outflow of government MMFs during the last three business
days in July 2011 and how the U.S. Government Fund had to suspend redemptions in Septem-
ber 2008).
85 See 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4)(A) (2012) (defining broker as “any person engaged in the
business of effecting transactions in securities for the account of others”); see also 15 U.S.C.
§ 78c(a)(5)(A) (2012) (defining dealer as “any person engaged in the business of buying and
selling securities . . . for such person’s own account through a broker or otherwise”).  Most
major firms engaged in brokering and dealing do both, and are routinely referred to as “broker-
dealers”; this includes the classic Wall Street investment banks such as Goldman Sachs and
Morgan Stanley.  (Technically, Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley are now financial holding
companies with broker-dealer subsidiaries.)
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which commercial banks were subject,86 and they were not supposed to
have access to commercial banks’ safety net, that is, deposit insurance
and eligibility for emergency loans from the Federal Reserve.
The most prominent type of runnable funding that broker dealers
used was the repurchase agreement, or “repo loan,” which involved a
borrower (the broker-dealer) financing a bond by posting it as collateral
for a short-term loan.87  The loan was often overnight, but was routinely
rolled over, and so functioned for the creditor much like a demand de-
posit.  The loan was uninsured, but the lender felt safe due to the credit
quality of the collateral (and, perhaps, expectations of government sup-
port if the borrower were considered “too big to fail”). The large broker-
dealers relied heavily on repo funding prior to the crisis, and continue to
do so today.88  A run on repo was just one of several channels that could
drain liquidity from a weakened broker-dealer; other channels include
derivatives counterparties novating agreements and withdrawing collat-
eral, and prime brokerage clients moving their accounts.89
2008. In March 2008, Bear Stearns’ repo lenders began demanding
more collateral and refusing to roll over their loans en masse—the func-
tional equivalent of a bank run from the pre-FDIC era.90  It soon became
clear that Bear Stearns would fail absent some drastic action.  Regulators
at the Treasury Department and the Federal Reserve orchestrated a sale
of Bear Stearns to JP Morgan, but had to take on the risk of loss on $30
86 See, e.g., Daniel M. Gallagher, Commissioner, The Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion—the Next 80 Years: The 15th Annual A.A. Sommer Jr. Lecture on Corporate, Securities
and Financial Law (Oct. 16, 2014), http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/
1370543190122#.VOF7KC4YPuY (“Despite robust market activity over the last few years,
the U.S. capital markets, the manner in which they are regulated, and the SEC itself collec-
tively face an existential threat: the encroaching imposition of so-called prudential regulation
on markets wholly unsuited to that regulatory paradigm.”).  Broker-dealers’ primary regulator,
the Securities and Exchange Commission, has traditionally focused on investor protection and
promoting capital formation rather than on the safety and soundness of broker dealers.
(“Safety and soundness” regulation can for most purposes be used synonymously with “pru-
dential” regulation.)  The SEC has differed in this respect from the regulators of commercial
banks because broker-dealers did not traditionally fund themselves with deposit-like debt, and
so their failure was unlikely to have the same type of systemic implications as a commercial
bank.  Even today, after the rise of shadow banking and the crisis, there is resistance to the
notion that the SEC should incorporate prudential concerns into its mission.
87 Tobias Adrian & Hyun Song Shin, The Shadow Banking System: Implications for
Financial Regulation 8 (Fed. Res. Bank of N.Y., Staff Report No. 382, 2009), http://www.
newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/sr382.pdf (“In a repo, the borrower sells a security to-
day for a price below the current market price on the understanding that it will buy it back in
the future at a pre-agreed price.”).
88 See Eric S. Rosengren, Keynote Remarks at Conference on the Risks of Wholesale
Funding, Broker-Dealer Finance and Financial Stability 14 fig.8 (Aug. 13, 2014), http://
www.bostonfed.org/news/speeches/rosengren/2014/081314/081314figuresandcomments.pdf.
89 See Darrell Duffie, The Failure Mechanics of Dealer Banks, 24 J. ECON. PERSP. 51,
60–68 (2010).
90 FCIC REPORT, supra note 3, at 288. R
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billion in risky assets to close the deal.91  A run on repo was also a chief
proximate cause of the demise of Lehman Brothers, which, of course,
was permitted to file for bankruptcy.  In the wake of Lehman’s failure,
the remaining stand-alone broker-dealers came under intense liquidity
strains, as well.92
Regulators’ Response. Regulators’ first-line response, starting in
March 2008, was to serve as lenders of last resort for broker-dealers via
the Federal Reserve’s emergency lending powers, which were authorized
by Federal Reserve Act § 13(3), allowing loans to non-banks in “unusual
and exigent circumstances.”93  Through a series of lending programs in-
cluding the Primary Dealer Credit Facility and the Term Securities Lend-
ing Facility (both established in March 2008), broker-dealers that were
no longer able to get adequate funding through private markets could
borrow from the Federal Reserve.94  The large broker-dealers relied on
these facilities to an extraordinary degree; by the end of September 2008,
for example, Morgan Stanley had borrowed $96.1 billion from these fa-
cilities, and Goldman Sachs $31.5 billion.95  The Federal Reserve still
has the power to engage in this type of lending,96 but this was not enough
to save the banks in 2008.  In particular, even after the passage of EESA
and the decision to inject capital directly into the largest banks, regula-
tors determined that systemic stability required a broad debt guarantee
program available to all banks and bank holding companies.  The pro-
gram was meant to ensure that large bank holding companies—whose
health was intricately tied up with their subsidiaries, including both
banks and broker-dealers—did not face additional liquidity strains by be-
ing unable to roll over long-term debt that was going to mature over the
coming months.  Recall that although the iconic Wall Street firms—
Goldman Sachs, Lehman Brothers, Morgan Stanley, Merrill Lynch, and
Bear Stearns—were all unaffiliated with banks and bank holding compa-
nies at the beginning of 2008, by the time the Debt Guarantee Program
was rolled out in October 2008, all major broker-dealers were part of
91 FINANCIAL CRISIS MANUAL, supra note 50, at 26 (noting that the Federal Reserve R
made “a secured loan of up to $30 billion to a special purpose vehicle, Maiden Lane, in order
to purchase ‘less liquid’ assets of Bear Stearns and facilitate the acquisition of Bear Stearns by
JPMorgan,” that “[t]he loan was authorized pursuant to Section 13(3),” that “JPMorgan would
be required to lend Maiden Lane $1 billion,” and that “[t]he Federal Reserve’s loan was to be
secured by the assets held by Maiden Lane” because JP Morgan did not want Bear’s assets).
92 FCIC REPORT, supra note 3, at 360–63. R
93 12 U.S.C. § 343(3)(A) (2012).
94 See generally FINANCIAL CRISIS MANUAL, supra note 50. R
95 FCIC REPORT, supra note 3, at 354. R
96 See infra Part III.A (arguing that Dodd-Frank created certain limitations on lending
under § 13(3), but these are unlikely to seriously constrain the Federal Reserve’s use of the
authority in a crisis).
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bank holding companies, and all would thus benefit from the program.97
The program was established by the FDIC as part of a “Temporary Li-
quidity Guarantee Program” (TLGP) pursuant to its authority to protect
creditors under the systemic risk exception to the least cost requirement
of FDIC resolutions.98  Participants, who had to pay premiums, were eli-
gible to receive FDIC guarantees for debt issuances of up to 125 percent
of the long-term debt that was due to mature in the period between Sep-
tember 30, 2008, and June 30, 2009.99  In addition to bolstering the sta-
bility of the corporate families that included broker-dealers, the
program—via a special exemption from provisions that limited eligibility
to banks and bank holding companies—directly guaranteed the long-
term debt issuances of Citigroup’s broker-dealer subsidiary.100
This debt guarantee program (DGP) was an important part of a
comprehensive strategy to stabilize the system, but authority to establish
a similar program in the future is no longer part of the (freestanding)
regulatory toolkit.  Dodd-Frank requires joint congressional approval for
any such comprehensive guarantee program in the future.101
Changes and Reforms Since 2008. Could broker-dealers again pose
the type of risk to the system that they did in 2008, when debt guarantees
were deemed a vital part of a comprehensive stabilization plan? As noted
above, the big broker dealers that were not part of bank holding compa-
nies in the years leading up to the crisis were not subject to any serious
prudential oversight.102  Today, all of the major broker-dealers are affili-
ated with bank holding companies,103 and thus subject to prudential rules
and oversight by the Federal Reserve on a consolidated basis.104  Addi-
tionally, the largest broker-dealers belong to bank holding companies
97 See FCIC REPORT, supra note 3, chs. 15, 18 & 20 (describing how Bear Stearns was
sold to JP Morgan; Merrill Lynch was sold to Bank of America; Lehman Brothers failed; and
Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley converted to bank holding companies).
98 For a detailed description of the TLGP, see FINANCIAL CRISIS MANUAL, supra note 50, R
at ch. 5. The systemic risk exception is codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)(G) (2013).  Note
that invocation of the exception requires the votes of two-thirds of the Board of Directors of
the FDIC and two-thirds of the Federal Reserve Board of Governors, as well as the approval of
the Secretary of the Treasury. Id.
99 FINANCIAL CRISIS MANUAL, supra note 50, at 127.  The program was extended several R
times. Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP. (Feb. 27, 2013),
https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/resources/TLGP/.
100 See SHEILA BAIR, BULL BY THE HORNS: FIGHTING TO SAVE MAIN STREET FROM WALL
STREET AND WALL STREET FROM ITSELF 117 (2012).
101 12 U.S.C. §§ 5612(c)(1) & 5613(a) (2010).
102 See supra note 86. R
103 See supra note 97. R
104 The prudential role of the Federal Reserve encompasses both rulemaking and supervi-
sion.  With respect to rulemaking, for example, all bank holding companies are subject to
capital requirements on a consolidated basis. See 12 C.F.R. pt. 225, app. A–B, D–E & G.
With respect to supervision, see generally Bank Holding Company Supervision Manual, FED.
RES. BD. (July 2015), http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/supmanual/bhc/bhc.pdf.
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that automatically qualify as “systemically important” by virtue of hold-
ing assets in excess of $50 billion, and are thus subject to stricter pruden-
tial standards, such as heightened capital and liquidity requirements.105
While prudential oversight is extremely important for addressing bank-
like risks, it has never been enough on its own to prevent panics.106  The
heightened prudential requirements that are applied to the largest broker-
dealers are significant improvements over the status quo ante, as is the
possibility of resolution under Title II of Dodd-Frank.107  The fact re-
mains, however, that broker-dealers continue to rely heavily on short-
term, runnable debt, which could contribute to a system-wide run, and
that the removal of the FDIC’s freestanding guarantee authority weakens
the regulatory toolkit with which regulators can respond to such a run.
Furthermore, while the largest broker-dealers today belong to bank
holding companies, it is possible that stand-alone broker-dealers will
grow in size, and—unless designated as systemically important by the
Financial Stability Oversight Council108—lack any effective prudential
oversight.109
C. Vulnerability 3: Commercial Banks
A third area that proved vulnerable to panic during the crisis was the
commercial banking industry.  This was surprising because many be-
lieved that we had “solved” runs for commercial banks through a combi-
nation of regulation, emergency lending, and deposit insurance.
Nevertheless, in the days after Lehman Brothers’ failure, Washington
Mutual, the sixth largest bank in the United States, experienced a fatal
run, primarily on business transaction accounts above the deposit insur-
ance cap.110  The FDIC seized the bank on September 25, 2008.111  The
105 See 12 U.S.C. § 5365 (2010).
106 It did not prevent runs on banks prior to deposit insurance, and even with deposit
insurance, some large commercial banks faced runs in 2008. See infra Part II.C.  It is also
worth noting that a few of the most bailout-dependent firms in the crisis, such as Citigroup and
Bank of America, were bank holding companies that had been subject to Federal Reserve
prudential oversight for years leading up to 2008.
107 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111–203,
§§ 201–217, 124 Stat. 1376, 1442–1520 (2010).
108 See 12 U.S.C. § 5323 (2010).
109 See supra note 86. R
110 FCIC REPORT, supra note 3, at 365. R
111 See id. at 365 (noting that this was the Thursday of the week following Lehman Broth-
ers’ bankruptcy filing); see also ALAN S. BLINDER, AFTER THE MUSIC STOPPED: THE FINAN-
CIAL CRISIS, THE RESPONSE, AND THE WORK AHEAD 155 (2013) (arguing that the fact that the
FDIC acted a day early spoke to the urgency and gravity of the situation).  As Alan Blinder
notes, it is almost unheard of for the FDIC to seize a bank on a Thursday; they generally wait
until Friday so that they have the weekend to ensure all the potential kinks in dealing with
insured depositor funds (usually transferring them to another bank) can be ironed out with
minimal disruption.
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bank was insolvent, but the FDIC declined to invoke the “systemic risk
exception” to protect uninsured creditors of the bank.112  The FDIC did
not have to tap into the deposit insurance fund at all, and in the end no
depositors, including those over the insurance cap, lost any money.  Un-
secured bondholders, however, wound up recovering only fifty-five cents
on the dollar.113  The mere fact that the FDIC made it clear it would not
protect uninsured creditors at Washington Mutual was enough, however,
to trigger a run on Wachovia, the fourth largest bank in the country.  The
following day, when it became clear that Wachovia would fail without
assistance, the FDIC, reversing course from its decision on Washington
Mutual, agreed to invoke the systemic risk exception to protect all the
bank’s creditors.114
While the unquestioned authority of the FDIC (in concert with the
Federal Reserve and the Treasury Secretary) to invoke the systemic risk
exception on a bank-by-bank basis would—even absent a broader guar-
antee—have helped avoid the utter catastrophe that would have resulted
from the MMF run absent the use of the Exchange Stabilization Fund, it
would also have been cumbersome and costly, and would not have pro-
vided quite the panic-slaying certainty a broad guarantee to protect all
depositors would.  To address the systemic problem, then, the FDIC
rolled out, as part of the TLGP, the Transaction Account Guarantee Pro-
gram, which insured all deposits held in non-interest bearing accounts,
without limit.115  These, again, were typically used by depositors with
large periodic needs for transactional liquidity, such as businesses meet-
ing monthly payroll, who had no tolerance for any risk of either delay or
loss on their transaction accounts, and whose withdrawals could have
been fatal to many banks.
Once again, this particular use of the systemic risk exception is no
longer available as a freestanding authority for the FDIC to employ in a
crisis.116  The absence of this broader authority could make the case-
specific invocation of the systemic risk exception more likely, weakening
112 FCIC REPORT, supra note 3, at 365–66. R
113 PAULSON, supra note 22, at 293. R
114 See FCIC REPORT, supra note 3, at 367; see also id. at 370 (stating that the FDIC did R
not ultimately need to cover any losses as part of the deal to sell Wachovia to Wells Fargo).
115 See FINANCIAL CRISIS MANUAL, supra note 50, at 137–40. R
116 The “systemic risk” exception is codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)(G)(i) (2006).  Use
of the exception to provide “open assistance,” or guarantees of debts other than insured depos-
its for banks and bank holding companies not in resolution, was removed by Dodd-Frank.  12
U.S.C. § 5613(a) (2010) (“Effective upon July 21, 2010, the Corporation may not exercise its
authority under section 1823(c)(4)(G)(i) of this title to establish any widely available debt
guarantee program for which section 5612 of this title would provide authority.”).  Section
5612 authorizes this type of widely available debt guarantee program only upon joint congres-
sional approval and that “[a]bsent such approval, the [FDIC] shall issue no such guarantees.”
12 U.S.C. § 5612(d) (2010).
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market discipline.  To illustrate the problem, consider that under many
market conditions, haircuts for Washington Mutual’s uninsured creditors
would likely not have had the contagion effects they did in September
2008.  Further, Washington Mutual was not well managed, and the credi-
bility of the threat of losses for (some) creditors of a poorly managed
bank is essential to creating any market discipline.117  However, to the
degree that there is real-time opacity as to the extent of systemic fragility
in a stressed market, regulators without the broad guarantee authority
may be more likely to err on the side of caution and invoke the systemic
risk exception in the first instance in a case like Washington Mutual.
Again, sometimes this will be the right choice, sometimes not.  The point
here is simply that if we want uninsured creditors to impose meaningful
discipline on banks, the threat of losses must be credible, and this threat
would be more credible if regulators were confident that they could pre-
vent potential runs from spreading with broad guarantee authorities.
The commercial banking system remains potentially vulnerable to a
run on uninsured deposits.  As of September 30, 2014, the aggregate de-
posits held in domestic offices by all U.S. depository institutions totaled
approximately $9.365 trillion, of which only approximately $5.43 trillion
was insured.118
D. Vulnerability 4: Regulatory Arbitrage
This Part so far has analyzed specific areas of vulnerability in 2008
that have yet to be “panic-proofed.”119  Even if these specific vulnerabili-
ties are eliminated, however, it is possible that similar vulnerabilities
could crop up in other places in the financial system.  Shadow banking,
in the form of short-term debt funding a portfolio of longer-term assets,
could emerge in new institutional settings.  Unless and until the problem
of very short-term debt issuance outside the deposit insurance umbrella is
effectively addressed, not only at broker-dealers and money-market
funds but everywhere, conditions conducive to financial panic could
reemerge.120  It is worth noting that the extraordinary demand for short-
term debt as a cash substitute creates a powerful incentive for regulatory
117 For a description of Washington Mutual’s demise, see generally DEP’T OF THE TREAS.
OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., EVALUATION OF FEDERAL REGULATORY OVERSIGHT OF WASHINGTON
MUTUAL BANK (2010), http://fdicoig.gov/reports10%5C10-002EV.pdf.
118 Statistics on Banking, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP. (Nov. 15, 2012), https://www2.
fdic.gov/SDI/SOB/ (under “Assets and Liabilities,” click on “Deposit Liabilities,” and then
click on “Run Report”).
119 Again, this is despite the traditional view that deposit insurance solved the problem of
panics in commercial banking. See, e.g., MILTON FRIEDMAN, A PROGRAM FOR MONETARY
STABILITY 38 (1960) (noting that “federal deposit insurance has performed a signal service in
rendering the banking system panic-proof”).
120 Morgan Ricks calls the traditional prohibition on non-banks issuing deposits “the first
law of banking.”  Ricks, supra note 31, at 78–79.  Shadow banking complies with the letter but R
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arbitrage to create new types of “near-money” assets if current alterna-
tives are eliminated.121
III. HOW A WEAKER SAFETY NET MAY EXACERBATE
MORAL HAZARD
This Article argues that the absence of a strong crisis response tool
in the form of freestanding guarantee authorities increases the likelihood
of a more promiscuous resort to weaker crisis-response tools, in the form
of bailouts of specific institutions or their creditors.  This Part specifies
what form these weak-tool bailouts might take and then examines in
greater detail the conditions under which the lack of guarantee authorities
will make bailouts more likely, exacerbating moral hazard.
There are a number of ways in which regulators may (still) effect
targeted bailouts.  By “bailout” I mean steps the government takes either
to ensure the continued existence and operation of an insolvent firm, or
to ensure that if the institution ceases to exist in its erstwhile form, at
least one class of creditor does not suffer losses that it otherwise would
in the absence of intervention.
As a preliminary point, it is important to observe that some of the
authorities regulators could rely on to bail out a specific institution or its
creditors formally prohibit bailouts under this definition.  These authori-
ties may nevertheless be used to affect a bailout, primarily because of the
immense difficulty of determining when a firm is actually insolvent in a
crisis.122  The difficulty of distinguishing mere illiquidity123 from funda-
mental insolvency under highly stressed market conditions arises in part
because markets become unreliable barometers of “fundamental value”
during a crisis.  In a crisis, markets for previously liquid financial assets
dry up as potential buyers and creditors “fly to safety” and hoard cash
out of prudence.  As Tim Geithner explains, “Imagine you had to sell
your house tomorrow in a market where no one could get a mortgage.
not the spirit of this prohibition.  Panic-proofing banks is not enough; to panic-proof the sys-
tem we must both panic-proof banks and apply the “first law of banking” to all non-banks.
121 See Zoltan Pozsar, Institutional Cash Pools and the Triffin Dilemma of the U.S. Bank-
ing System 14–15 figs.7 & 8 (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper 11/190, 2011), https://
www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2011/wp11190.pdf.
122 Charles Goodhart goes so far as to call the notion that we can distinguish between
insolvency and illiquidity a “myth.”  Charles Goodhart, Myths About the Lender of Last Re-
sort, in FINANCIAL CRISES, CONTAGION, AND THE LENDER OF LAST RESORT 227, 229 (Charles
Goodhart & Gerhard Illing eds., 2002) (observing that “[t]he possibility of large shocks—for
example, large jumps in asset prices, especially in crises when such a jump is downwards—
means that there may be multiple equilibria, to use the current jargon”).
123 Illiquidity here means that the firm is unable to sell assets quickly enough, or to find
investors to inject new cash, in order to meet its own debt obligations.  For example, a bank
that is fundamentally solvent may still be illiquid if its depositors run.  The bank will not be
able to sell its assets fast enough, nor will new customers deposit cash quickly enough to
enable the bank, left to its own devices, to honor all its depositors’ withdrawal demands.
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You’d have to sell it at a tiny fraction of its potential value.”124  Further,
even in normal market conditions, large financial institutions’ balance
sheets are vast and opaque, and the valuation of many of their assets
requires a huge degree of judgment.125
Distinguishing insolvency from illiquidity may also be difficult be-
cause, in a crisis, the question of a firm’s insolvency may be endogenous
to the government’s decision to intervene or not.  For example, if failing
to halt a panic leads to a deep recession, then many borrowers in the real
economy, who would otherwise have been able to pay off debts, wind up
defaulting, pushing a bank that would have been solvent into insolvency.
While it is likely that at least some of the firms regulators saved with
loans, capital injections, and guarantees in 2008 were fundamentally in-
solvent at the time and have since earned their way back to solvency, it is
nevertheless worth noting that the Treasury and the FDIC both wound up
making money on their guarantee programs.126  The Treasury made
124 GEITHNER, supra note 1, at 283. R
125 In discussing Bank of America’s reported results for the third quarter of 2014, finan-
cial columnist Matt Levine provides a piquant and amusing account of the impact differences
among various accounting conventions—each acceptable for different regulatory purposes—
can have on a bank’s putative profitability. See Matt Levine, Bank of America Made $168
Million Last Quarter,  More or Less ,  BLOOMBERG (Oct.  15, 2014),  http:/ /
www.bloombergview.com/articles/2014-10-15/bank-of-america-made-168-million-last-quar-
ter-more-or-less (explaining how different valuation approaches, each valid under U.S. Gener-
ally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), yield three different numbers for Bank of
America’s third-quarter earnings). Levine writes:
So you get at least three numbers—positive $168 million, negative $70 million
or negative $636 million—using just U.S. generally accepted accounting principles.
But why stop there?  Other accounting principles are sometimes accepted.  There is
tax, for instance. Bank of America had $663 million of tax expense this quarter, on
$831 million of pre-tax income, which looks a bit like an 80 percent tax rate.  This is
not because the tax rate applicable to Bank of America is 80 percent.  It’s because
tax accountants get a different number for Bank of America’s income than GAAP
accountants do.  For instance, if Bank of America paid a 35 percent tax rate, then its
pre-tax income, for tax purposes, was $1.9 billion, and its post-tax income, under tax
accounting, was $1.2 billion.  Positive $1.2 billion.  Why not.
Or regulatory capital.  Bank of America’s common equity tier 1 capital went
down by $1.6 billion this past quarter.  Some of that is dividends—it accrued about
$526 million in common dividends—but most of it is not.  It’s just that regulatory
capital and GAAP measure income differently in some respects.  And the same in
other respects.  This is very confusing.  It’s so confusing that Bank of America got it
wrong by $4 billion earlier this year.  Or by $2.7 billion.  Depending how you count!
Id.
126 See Press Release, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., FDIC-Insured Institutions Earned $34.7
Billion in The Fourth Quarter of 2012 (Feb. 26, 2013), https://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/
2013/pr13014.html (noting that the Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program “contributed a
total of $9.3 billion to the [Deposit Insurance Fund] over the life of the program”); see also
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Treasury Announces Expiration of Guarantee Pro-
gram for Money Market Funds (Sept. 18, 2009), http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-
releases/Pages/tg293.aspx (noting that over the life of the MMF guarantee program, the Trea-
sury “had no losses . . .  and earned approximately $1.2 billion in participation fees”).
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money on its TARP injections,127 and the Federal Reserve made money
on its emergency lending programs.128  As Larry Summers has observed,
“[t]he government got back substantially more money than it invested”
during the crisis.129
A. Targeted Interventions
What, then, may regulators do to save particular institutions or their
creditors?  First and foremost, the FDIC can still invoke the systemic risk
exception to bail out uninsured creditors of a bank in resolution, though
it can no longer use it to provide broad guarantees or “open assistance”
to banks not in resolution.130
The Federal Reserve, as lender of last resort, can lend to banks
through its discount window and to non-banks under § 13(3) of the Fed-
eral Reserve Act, which permits such lending in “unusual and exigent
circumstances.”131  This, of course, was one of the central crisis response
tools in 2008.  The Federal Reserve’s § 13(3) powers have been con-
strained somewhat by Dodd-Frank,132 which restricts § 13(3) lending to
programs of broad-based eligibility,133 and prohibits lending to insolvent
institutions.134  In practice, however, this may not impose much of a con-
straint on the Federal Reserve’s emergency lending in a crisis.  First, as
noted above, the line between illiquidity and insolvency can be impossi-
ble to draw with certainty in a crisis, and the statute does little to con-
strain the Federal Reserve’s discretion in making a solvency
determination.135  Second, programs intended for individual institutions
127 See, e.g., Chris Isidore, U.S. Ends TARP with $15.3 Billion Profit, CNN MONEY (Dec.
19, 2014), http://money.cnn.com/2014/12/19/news/companies/government-bailouts-end/.
While few in the financial sector would consider this a healthy return on a six-year, $426
billion investment program, it is, nevertheless, worth noting that, with the exception of the auto
manufacturers, all of the “systemically significant” TARP recipients paid back more to the
Treasury than they received. See, e.g., Ryan Tracy et al., Bank Bailouts Approach a Final
Reckoning, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 19, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/ally-financial-exits-tarp-
as-treasury-sells-remaining-stake-1419000430.
128 See, e.g., Chris Isidore, Fed Made $9 Trillion in Emergency Overnight Loans, CNN
MONEY (Dec. 1, 2010), http://money.cnn.com/2010/12/01/news/economy/fed_reserve_data
_release/.
129 Summers, supra note 27. R
130 See supra note 116. R
131 12 U.S.C. § 343(3)(A) (2010).
132 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act),
Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1101, 124 Stat. 1376, 2113 (2010).
133 See 12 U.S.C. § 343(3)(A).
134 See 12 U.S.C. § 343(3)(B)(ii).
135 See id. (“The Board shall establish procedures to prohibit borrowing from programs
and facilities by borrowers that are insolvent.  Such procedures may include a certification
from the chief executive officer (or other authorized officer) of the borrower, at the time the
borrower initially borrows under the program or facility (with a duty by the borrower to update
the certification if the information in the certification materially changes), that the borrower is
not insolvent.”).
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can often be established with general eligibility requirements.  Indeed, as
part of its mandate under the EESA, the Treasury established a widely
available Asset Guarantee Program that was used once to guarantee $301
billion of troubled assets held by Citigroup.136  It also established a Sig-
nificant Failing Institutions Program with general eligibility requirements
that it used once (for AIG),137 and a Targeted Investment Program with
similar general eligibility requirements that it used twice (for Citigroup
and Bank of America).138
The Orderly Liquidation Authority, established by Title II of the
Dodd-Frank Act, is supposed to provide a credible alternative to a bailout
in a Lehman-like situation, but may nonetheless be a tool for providing a
backdoor bailout to creditors of a systemically important financial insti-
tution (SIFI) resolved under its auspices.  The current regulatory strategy
is to require the SIFI holding company to issue enough long-term debt—
debt that is not runnable and that does not have the systemic importance
of money market debt—so that all the SIFI’s consolidated losses can be
absorbed at the holding company level.139  A SIFI’s actual operations,
however, are generally not carried out by the holding company, but
rather by its operating subsidiaries.140  All these operating subsidiaries
would be transferred untouched to a new “bridge holding company;” the
old SIFI shareholders would be wiped out, and the old SIFI holding com-
pany long-term debt holders would trade their debt claims for equity in
the new holding company (which would presumably be worth much less
at the moment of resolution).141
A recapitalized SIFI in Title II may, however, face a liquidity
crunch even if it is fundamentally solvent.  The short-term creditors of its
operating subsidiaries may (out of an abundance of caution due to the
opacity of the SIFI’s true value) refuse to roll over their loans, and the
SIFI may not have enough cash and liquid securities to pay them all
back.  In such a situation, to avoid the SIFI subsidiaries defaulting on the
short-term debt, or the occurrence of fire sales of assets that could
weaken the SIFI (as well as other institutions holding similar assets),142
136 See FINANCIAL CRISIS MANUAL, supra note 50, at 53–54.  Bank of America also took R
steps to use the program, but ultimately did not. Id.
137 Id. at 76–77.
138 Id. at 77–78.
139 For a description of the resolution strategy, see Resolution of Systemically Important
Financial Institutions: The Single Point of Entry Strategy, 78 Fed. Reg. 76,614, 76,615–19
(proposed Dec. 18, 2013) [hereinafter FDIC Proposed Rule].
140 Id.
141 The actual mechanics are, of course, slightly more complex. See id.
142 See Anil K. Kashyap et al., Rethinking Capital Regulation, FED. RESERVE BANK OF
KAN. CITY 13 (Aug. 2008), http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/Fed-Jackson
Hole.pdf (“When bank A adjusts by liquidating assets [through a fire sale] . . . it imposes a cost
on another bank B who holds the same assets: the mark-to-market price of B’s assets will be
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the Treasury is authorized to lend to the bridge holding company (which
can then channel the loans to the subsidiaries).143  The loans require the
bridge holding company to be solvent (and must be fully collateralized),
but, again, whether or not a SIFI in such a situation is solvent is not
always a clear-cut issue.  Some valuations require discretion, and a few
optimistic assumptions could, in ambiguous situations, ensure that the
necessary solvency determination is made for the Treasury to proceed
with the required loans.  If the Treasury fails to recuperate all its money,
then it can recover its losses by a levy on other SIFIs,144 but that does not
make the action vis-a`-vis the resolved SIFI’s short-term creditors any
less a bailout.
Finally, regulators may use moral suasion to facilitate private
bailouts, as they did with creditors of Long-Term Capital Management in
1998.145  Indeed, all accounts of the infamous “Lehman Weekend” re-
ported that the other Wall Street banks were ready to assume the risk of
losses on billions of dollars of Lehman’s bad assets if a pending sale to
Barclays had not been nixed by British regulators.146
B. Conditions for Increasing Moral Hazard Costs
I argue that the existence of the “weak” tools discussed in Part III.A,
combined with the absence of stronger tools in the form of guarantee
authorities, makes it more likely that the worst-managed financial firms
will be saved and their creditors made whole by the government.  The net
moral hazard costs in the absence of guarantee authorities could, there-
fore, be greater.  This, again, is not necessarily the case, but is very plau-
sibly true under current conditions in the United States. What are these
conditions?
First, there is often a lack of clarity in the early stages of market
turmoil as to whether such turmoil is a sign of a healthy correction, or a
pushed down, putting pressure on B’s capital position and in turn forcing it to liquidate some
of its positions.  Thus selling by one bank begets selling by others, and so on, creating a
vicious circle.”).
143 See FDIC Proposed Rule, supra note 139. R
144 See id. at 76,617.
145 Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) was a prominent and highly leveraged
hedge fund that risked defaulting in 1998.  Fourteen private firms agreed to infuse capital into
LTCM to keep it from failing.  The negotiations of the firms participating in the private bailout
of LTCM were coordinated and hosted by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.  For ac-
counts of the events surrounding LTCM’s near demise and the role of the Federal Reserve in
saving it, see Michael Fleming & Weiling Liu, Near Failure of Long-term Capital Manage-
ment, FED. RES. BANK OF N.Y. (Nov. 22, 2013), http://www.federalreservehistory.org/Events/
DetailView/52; Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Testimony Before the Committee on Banking and
Financial Services (Oct. 1, 1998), http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/testimony/1998/
19981001.htm.
146 PAULSON, supra note 22, at 210 (describing how the other major Wall Street firms had R
agreed in principle to “put up more than $30 billion” to facilitate a sale).
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symptom of a mild downturn, or instead a harbinger of crisis.  There is
an impressive body of evidence that regulators were consistently behind
the curve in diagnosing the crisis through most of 2007 and 2008.147
Better data could certainly help regulators,148 but there are compelling
reasons to believe that this problem cannot be completely addressed by
more or better information.149  In particular, regulators will often be una-
ble—and will know they are unable—to predict with any confidence the
consequences of the failure of a large bank in jittery markets.
Second, conditions can move from stressed to panicked with great
speed, before regulators have a chance to react.  Financial crises tend to
occur in line with Ernest Hemingway’s description of how one goes
bankrupt: “[g]radually and then suddenly.”150  A good example of this is
the slow decline of Lehman Brothers (lasting through the summer of
2008), followed by its quick collapse, which led within two days to the
Reserve Primary breaking the buck and the run on the money market
fund industry.
Third, without guarantee authorities, regulators’ other tools are
likely to be unequal to the task of containing a full-blown panic.  Again,
absent the use of the ESF to guarantee MMF accounts, the run on MMFs
would have been catastrophic.  Congress would probably have acted
eventually, but the damage a run like this could cause in the time it
would plausibly take Congress to act is terrifying to contemplate.151
147 See, e.g., Jon Hilsenrath, New View into Fed’s Response to Crisis, WALL ST. J., Feb.
21, 2014, at A1 (discussing the release of transcripts from Federal Reserve meetings during the
crisis after a five year lag, and describing how officials “spent much of the spring and summer
[of 2008] hamstrung by uncertainty, disagreement and an unexpected inflation jump”).
148 See generally Andrew G. Haldane, Speech at the Sec. Indus. & Fin. Mkts. Ass’n
Symp., Towards a Common Financial Language (Mar. 14, 2012), http://www.bankofengland.
co.uk/publications/Documents/speeches/2012/speech552.pdf.
149 One problem is that financial systems exhibit features of nonlinearity, meaning that
infinitesimal differences in conditions today can lead to outsize differences in outcomes to-
morrow. See, e.g., Nimalan Arinaminpathy et al., Size and Complexity in Model Financial
Systems, 109 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 18,338 (2012), http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/arti-
cles/PMC3494937/.  Another problem is that data requires accurate and timely interpretation
for it to be useful.  For example, Gary Klein has argued persuasively that a lack of data was
not the problem in a variety of governmental failures to anticipate crises, including Pearl Har-
bor, 9/11, and Enron; rather, the lack of an appropriate interpretive framework impeded effec-
tive data filtering and regulators’ ability to connect the dots. See GARY KLEIN, STREETLIGHTS
AND SHADOWS: SEARCHING FOR THE KEYS TO ADAPTIVE DECISION MAKING 136–43 (2011).
150 To be precise, it is how one of his characters describes how he (the character) went
bankrupt. ERNEST HEMINGWAY, THE SUN ALSO RISES 127 (1996).
151 See, e.g., Stewart, supra note 23, at 73 (“The Treasury official described the situation: R
‘Lehman Brothers begat the Reserve [Primary] collapse, which begat the money-market run,
so the money-market funds wouldn’t buy commercial paper.  The commercial-paper market
was on the brink of destruction.  At this point, the banking system stops functioning.  You’re
pulling four trillion out of the private sector’—money-market funds—‘and giving it to the
government in the form of T-bills.  That was commercial paper funding GE, Citigroup, FedEx,
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CJP\25-1\CJP102.txt unknown Seq: 31 23-DEC-15 16:49
2015] THE MORAL HAZARD PARADOX 125
(Recall that it took 13 days and one failed vote for Congress to pass
TARP).
Fourth, regulators know that they lack the power to guarantee the
system if worse comes to worst, and could, therefore, be anxious and less
willing to let a small financial brush fire burn—to let a firm or two fail,
clearing out the dry underbrush—for fear that it could suddenly turn into
a fierce conflagration.  This would mean that they will be more likely to
use the weaker tools mentioned above—moral suasion, emergency lend-
ing, and so on—early, before the problem becomes bigger than they can
handle.  These (smaller) steps could often be employed when inaction
would not have led to a crisis, and would, in fact, have made the system
more robust, by weeding out weak performers.
Finally, market actors perceive this state of affairs—i.e., the limita-
tions of regulatory tools and the incentives regulators have to avoid
worst-case scenarios—and come to rely more on regulators to act early
to prevent crises by bailing out specific firms or their creditors.
A brief, highly stylized numerical example may help illustrate the
decision-making calculus top regulators face when a systemically impor-
tant firm falters.  Assume that guarantee authorities would be able to halt
a panic once it starts, but that “weak” tools cannot.  Weak tools can,
however, prevent a panic from starting.  Assume further, for purposes of
exposition, that refraining from a weak-tool bailout can lead to a panic
with a probability greater than zero but less than one.  Finally, assume
that regulators are risk neutral and want to minimize expected social
costs.152
Imagine first that the regulators lack guarantee authorities but retain
weak bailout tools, and are considering intervening to save a particular
firm, “BigBank.”  Whether or not regulators will intervene to save
BigBank depends on how they perceive several key variables: p, the
probability that BigBank’s failure will lead to a broad panic; c1, the net
social cost of that panic;153 b, the net social benefit of BigBank’s failure
if it does not lead to a panic;154 and c2, the net social cost of an early,
all the commercial-paper issuers.  This was systemic risk. Suddenly, you have a global bank
holiday.’”).
152 Relaxing the assumptions about regulators would likely accentuate the dynamics out-
lined here to the degree that regulators are risk averse and that they perceive the cost of a panic
as significantly larger than the cost of a bailout.  For example, if a panic were low-probability
but very high cost, risk-averse regulators might bail out a bank even if they believed it was not
cost-justified in expected-value terms.
153 For a discussion of panic costs, see supra note 45 and accompanying text. R
154 A firm’s failure could have a salutary impact on market discipline, increasing systemic
stability and overall efficiency in the allocation of capital.
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targeted bailout.155  Regulators should intervene to bail out BigBank if
they believe that
p * c1 + (1-p) * b < c2.
For example, if regulators believe that the probability (p) that
BigBank’s failure will lead to a panic is 0.2, the cost (c1) of a panic is -
100, the benefit (b) of BigBank’s failure if a panic does not ensue is 5,
and the cost (c2) of a bailout is -10, then regulators will have a strong
incentive to intervene.  (0.2 * -100 + 0.8 * 5 = -16 < -10.)156
The calculus shifts, however, if regulators have freestanding guaran-
tee authorities.  First and most importantly, the (perceived) cost of panic
will be significantly lower; for purposes of illustration, suppose regula-
tors now believe c1 is -20.  (The lingering costs may be due to a combi-
nation of the fact that some damage may be wrought prior to regulators
establishing guarantee programs, and to the fact that the guarantee pro-
gram itself may exacerbate a different type of moral hazard, as described
below.)  Further, the likelihood of a panic may be diminished, as the
mere fact that regulators can halt a run may dampen incentives to run at
the margin.  Suppose regulators believe p is 0.1.  Now, from regulators’
perspective, it makes more sense to let BigBank fail, since the inequality
sign is reversed.  (0.1 * -20 + 0.9 * 5 = 2.5 > -10.)
In this model, therefore, BigBank is more likely to be saved by reg-
ulators if they lack guarantee powers. With guarantee authorities, regula-
tors will be more ready to allow the weakest and worst-managed firms to
die and to let losses fall on creditors, as they can be confident in their
ability to contain the fire if it starts to rage out of control.  This would
increase market discipline for large financial firms.  Without guarantee
authorities, the worst firms will be likelier to receive targeted bailouts,
weakening discipline.
This is not, of course, the end of the story.  The moral hazard effect
described above must be balanced against other possible incentive distor-
tions that guarantee powers could exacerbate. For example, if guarantee
authorities are invoked in systemic crises, financial firms may have an
incentive to over-invest in, and even create, “tail-risky” assets that are
highly correlated with the broader market and likely to default only in
155 Bailouts could skew incentives going forward, creating conditions that demand further
bailouts, undermining stability, and lessening efficiency in the allocation of capital.
156 Any values assigned to these variables will, of course, be highly contestable; indeed,
the essence of the debate over whether bailout tools (strong or weak) should be deployed
hinges on one’s view of which cost is greater: c1 or c2.  (As noted below, these costs depend
as well on a number of features of regulation and the markets in addition to any bailout deci-
sion.)  The numbers in this illustration seem plausible to me as (highly abstract and simplified)
representations of the actual stakes in these decisions, but the more important point for pur-
poses of this Article is that they are, I argue, plausible representations of decision-makers’
perceptions, since decisions will be driven by those perceptions.
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systemic crises.157  I do not purport to prove that one moral hazard effect
outweighs the other; indeed, I do not believe such proof is possible.158
If, however, net moral hazard costs are exacerbated by guarantee author-
ities, it brings us back to the trade-off with which the debate started: the
potential costs of short-run instability in the absence of guarantees versus
long-run moral hazard costs with guarantees.  This Article supports the
arguments of the pro-guarantee side of the debate by showing that while
guarantee authorities may exacerbate moral hazard, there may also be
moral hazard costs to failing to provide regulators with guarantee author-
ities.  Ex ante, the net effect is ambiguous.
Some might also question a key assumption upon which the argu-
ment of this Article rests: that regulators would, in fact, be more likely to
resist the urge to use weak tools to bail out firms and creditors if they had
guarantee powers.  It is, of course, impossible to disprove the possibility
that regulators, perhaps irredeemably “captured” by banks, will always
and everywhere act to prevent financial firm failures and losses to credi-
tors.  This Article argues, however, that a more plausible reading of regu-
lators’ incentives is that they are at least ambivalent about saving
faltering firms, and will often find it distasteful.  It is instructive here to
recall the intense pressure regulators faced in early September 2008 to
show toughness and to punish moral hazard: “The bailouts [prior to Leh-
man] had brought into rare alignment the Republican right wing, averse
to any tampering with the free market, and the Democratic left, outraged
by the government rescue of Wall Street’s overpaid e´lite.”159  Regulators
will often want to let a firm fail, and giving them the tools to contain the
damage if failure sparks a panic will allow them to yield to popular pres-
sure on this point with a clear conscience.160  (The argument of this
piece, of course, is that in the absence of guarantee powers such yielding
is both less likely to occur and much less likely to be a good thing if it
were to occur).
Finally, it is worth emphasizing that if freestanding guarantee au-
thorities were reestablished, they should be coupled with tighter regula-
157 See Joshua D. Coval et al., Economic Catastrophe Bonds, 99 AM. ECON. REV. 628
(2009) (analyzing structured financial products as “economic catastrophe bonds” that “default
only under severe economic conditions”).
158 See John C. Coates IV, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulation: Case Studies
and Implications, 124 YALE L.J. 882, 888 (2015) (“[F]inance is at the heart of the economy; is
social and political; and is characterized by non-stationary relationships that exhibit secular
change (that is, long-term structural changes).  These features undermine the ability of science
to precisely and reliably estimate the effects of financial regulations, even retrospectively.”).
159 Stewart, supra note 23. R
160 Id. (explaining a comment by a Treasury official about the immediate aftermath of
Lehman’s failure, before the full extent of the fallout was clear: “‘Everybody in some part of
their brain thought it was a good thing for Lehman Brothers to go under’ . . . . ‘Was this ten
per cent of the brain?  I don’t know. . . . But the thought was there somewhere.’”).
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tion of entities that issue deposit-like debt.  The costs of instability and of
moral hazard do not depend solely on the existence of insurance; they
depend very much on other features of the regulatory system as well,
including effective supervision, appropriate prudential rules such as capi-
tal and liquidity requirements, the existence and efficacy of a resolution
mechanism for huge banks, and the existence and efficacy of market dis-
ciplinary forces.
IV. OBJECTIONS AND QUALIFICATIONS
A. “Regulators Will Find a Way”
One possible critique of the view advanced in this Article is that the
formal authorities of regulators are irrelevant: when push comes to shove
in a crisis, they will do what is needed to save the system.  I am some-
what sympathetic of this view when it comes to the targeted interven-
tions described above in Part III.A, but I believe this view significantly
overstates the likelihood that regulators would, without congressional ac-
tion, find a way to provide the sorts of guarantees they did in 2008 if
another crisis erupted today.
Admittedly, the government’s response to the crisis in 2008 lends
some support to the optimistic view of regulatory ingenuity.  Indeed, the
guarantees that played such a central role in holding the system together
were based on statutes that most top regulators likely did not believe,
heading into the crisis, actually authorized anything like the programs
that were eventually extended under their aegis.  For example, as indi-
cated in Part I.A, accounts of the decision to guarantee MMFs make clear
that Paulson himself did not know it was possible until one of his aides
suggested it at the moment of gravest risk to the system.161
As noted, the Treasury guaranteed MMFs through the Exchange
Stabilization Fund (ESF), which was established as part of the Gold Re-
serve Act of 1934 in order to stabilize the U.S. dollar vis-a`-vis other
currencies.  Some have cast a skeptical eye on the legal justification for
this.  Economist and former vice chairman of the Federal Reserve Alan
Blinder states the skeptical view:
Ever since Bear Stearns, Secretary Paulson had in-
sisted that he had no slush fund to tap. . . . After what
must have been some interesting internal discussions at
the Treasury, Paulson decided that the Exchange Stabili-
zation Fund (ESF) was such a fund, after all.  His puta-
tive rationale? Because some of the skittish money fund
investors were foreign, “a collapse of the money fund
161 See supra Part I.A.
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industry could easily lead to a run on the dollar.”  Thin.
Almost any adverse event in the United States could po-
tentially “lead to a run on the dollar.”  But in the Trea-
sury’s view, the governing statute set a pretty low bar for
the use of the ESF.  After all, there was a panic going on,
wasn’t there?  Didn’t that imperil the dollar?162
Blinder later asks, “[W]hy couldn’t the ESF have been used for Leh-
man? . . . [P]art of the answer is clear: The two decisions were made in
different milieus (political versus technocratic), under different laws, and
by different lawyers.”163  In fairness, part of the difference in milieus
also had to do with the perceived risk of a total and thoroughly destabi-
lizing meltdown—a plausible reading of contemporary accounts is that
such perceived risk had climbed from something still fairly well below
fifty percent leading into the “Lehman weekend” to significantly above
fifty percent in the days following Reserve Primary’s implosion.  Consis-
tent with this observation, Professor Morgan Ricks, who worked on
Geithner’s crisis response team when he became Treasury Secretary, pro-
vides a more sympathetic account of the legal rationale:
As . . . amended, the authorizing statute [for ESF] enti-
tles the Treasury Secretary to use Exchange Stabilization
Fund resources to “deal in gold, foreign exchange, and
other instruments of credit and securities” in a manner
“[c]onsistent with the obligations of the Government in
the International Monetary Fund on orderly exchange ar-
rangements and a stable system of exchange rates.”  The
pertinent IMF obligations, in turn, include an undertak-
ing by members to “seek to promote stability by foster-
ing orderly underlying economic and financial
conditions and a monetary system that does not tend to
produce erratic disruptions.”  Reasonable people might
disagree as to whether these provisions furnished a
sound legal foundation for the money market fund guar-
antee program—but Treasury’s reading does appear to
be at least in the range of plausible legal
interpretations.164
At any rate, since Congress affirmatively legislated away this use of the
ESF in the EESA, it is doubtful that a similarly plausible freestanding
legal authority exists to forestall a run on MMFs should one erupt.165
162 BLINDER, supra note 111, at 145. R
163 Id. at 146.
164 Ricks, supra note 31, at 132 (footnotes omitted). R
165 GEITHNER, supra note 1, at 52–55 (noting one previous occasion when Congress re- R
stricted the use of the ESF).  The ESF had been tapped in 1994 to provide an emergency loan
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The legal basis for the FDIC’s guarantees under the TLGP arose out
of a “systemic risk exception” to the “least cost requirement” for resolv-
ing banks under the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement
Act of 1991.166  The use of this exception to provide “open” assistance in
the form of guarantees to (i) banks that were not in resolution and (ii)
non-banks (specifically bank holding companies as well as GMAC and
Citi’s broker-dealer subsidiary) was controversial.167  The FDIC chair-
woman at the time, Sheila Bair, writes in her memoirs that “[l]awyers at
the Treasury Department and Federal Reserve insisted that we did have
the authority to guarantee holding company debt; our lawyers thought
their interpretations were a stretch but couldn’t definitively determine
that we were legally prohibited from doing so.”168  Was there another
plausible authority to ground this guarantee?  The likely answer is “no.”
Skeptical even of the legal basis for injecting capital into financial insti-
tutions, Bair tells us that “[s]ince Treasury had requested that Congress
give it the authority to buy troubled assets, the legal authority for Trea-
sury to make capital investments was ambiguous at best and nonexistent
for debt guarantees.  The FDIC, with our authority to provide systemic
risk assistance, was the Treasury’s best bet.”169
It may very well be that a clever lawyer in the Treasury or the Fed-
eral Reserve will find some provision that, with a sufficiently creative
legal interpretation, could ground necessary guarantee authorities in ex-
tremis, though I remain skeptical.  The argument here, however, does not
rest on proof of the absence of some provision that an imaginative law-
yer might seize on to authorize action in an emergency.  Rather, the
claim is that regulators themselves understand that they are constrained
by law and that the law prohibits broad guarantees.170  Any deviation
from this would invite intense political backlash and this is enough to
to the government of Mexico, which was facing a run on its currency.  The loan was paid back
with interest, but aroused enough populist outrage that Senator Al D’Amato of New York
sponsored a provision limiting the Treasury’s ability to make similar loans in the future.  This
proved particularly burdensome when the U.S. tried to orchestrate a response to the run on
Thailand a few years later.  No one considered trying to skirt the requirement, however).
166 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)(G) (2013).
167 See generally U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO 10-100, FEDERAL DEPOSIT
INSURANCE ACT: REGULATORS’ USE OF SYSTEMIC RISK EXCEPTION RAISES MORAL HAZARD
CONCERNS AND OPPORTUNITIES EXIST TO CLARIFY THE PROVISION app. II (2010), http://
www.gao.gov/assets/310/303248.pdf.
168 See BAIR, supra note 100, at 113. R
169 Id. (emphasis added).
170 For example, in his memoirs, Timothy Geithner makes clear that, in his view, the
Achilles’ Heel of Dodd-Frank is its elimination of the FDIC’s freestanding authority to create
another TLGP-like guarantee program during a crisis—a view that only makes sense if he
considers the elimination of the authority binding. See, e.g., GEITHNER, supra note 1, at 432 R
(arguing that Congress will have to restore the FDIC’s authority “in the heat of the next crisis
if not before” and that “[e]ven in an emergency, Congress is likely to be slow to restore it,
which is why its loss is so dangerous”).
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motivate them to try to prevent the failure of systemically important fi-
nancial institutions and the risk of contagion and catastrophe in stressed
markets.  It is instructive to recall that even as regulators made unprece-
dented use of the authorities they had in 2008, they did not pretend such
authorities were without limit: they did believe congressional action was
required for injecting capital directly into financial institutions, precisely
because of the absence of any provision plausibly providing freestanding
authority for such action.
B. “Congress Will Rise to the Occasion”
A variation on the argument that regulators will find a way to save
the system is that if they lack the necessary authorities, Congress can
supply them, as it did with capital injections with the EESA, and as
Dodd-Frank specifically provides for with respect to joint congressional
authorizations of TLGP-type guarantees.171  This is certainly possible,
but a number of considerations counsel against relying on Congress to
act with the necessary alacrity in the midst of a market panic.  The plan
that ultimately became EESA was announced on September 20, 2008,
but did not pass Congress until October 3, 2008, thirteen days later.172
The capital injections authorized under the EESA were an essential part
of the medium-term solution to the crisis; the run on MMFs was a near-
term emergency requiring immediate action.  The damage such a run
could have wreaked over thirteen days is extraordinary.
In the event of another run on MMFs, we would need Congress to
act much more quickly than it did in September and October 2008; there
are reasons to fear that it may not even be able to act as quickly as it did.
In a recent interview Nobel Laureate Paul Krugman observed,
I find myself in meetings with international financial
types.  It’s all the usual discussions, and they don’t like
to talk domestic U.S. politics, but then at some point,
somebody says, what if we had another major financial
crisis?  What if we really needed something like TARP
again?  What are the chances that something like TARP
could actually happen in this political environment?
And everybody goes quiet, and looks down at their
blotter.173
Even aside from partisan gamesmanship, it is possible that a nontrivial
number of senators and representatives hold views that, while under-
171 See 12 U.S.C. §§ 5612(c)(1), 5613(a) (2010).
172 See Text of Draft Proposal for Bailout Plan, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 20, 2008), http://
www.nytimes.com/2008/09/21/business/21draftcnd.html; see also Herszenhorn, supra note 56. R
173 Ezra Klein, What is Paul Krugman Afraid of?, VOX (Dec. 29, 2014), http://
www.vox.com/2014/12/29/7458807/paul-krugman-economist.
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standably popular on Main Street, have been pejoratively described by
Geithner as embodying “moral hazard fundamentalism” and “Old Testa-
ment populism.”174  Even those in Congress who are more willing to
consider bailouts if the damage of inaction is serious enough often need
to see blood on the tracks before acting.175  For example, the run on
Wachovia was a near-catastrophe that could have sparked widespread
runs on other commercial banks for the first time since the early 1930s;
though a targeted intervention by the FDIC (announcing its intent to in-
voke the systemic risk exception) forestalled a panic and facilitated the
sale of Wachovia to Wells Fargo,176 it was—since everyone had as-
sumed commercial banks were immune from panic—a shocking illustra-
tion of the fragility of the system.  Yet Paulson tells us in his memoirs,
[W]ithout intervention [Wachovia] certainly would have
collapsed.  Many in Congress, however, didn’t under-
stand how precarious the situation was.  All weekend as
we negotiated the fine points of TARP on the Hill, I had
warned that another huge bank was about to go down.
Now, even as we struggled to get $700 billion for the
entire financial system, the FDIC had guaranteed nearly
$300 billion worth of assets for one bank and no one had
blinked an eye.  We said, “It’s urgent we get TARP—
look at Wachovia,” and they said, “Wachovia was just
acquired.”  They didn’t seem to get it.177
In any event, as with the response to presumptions of a regulatory deus
ex machina, the argument respecting moral hazard does not require proof
that Congress will not act in time; it requires establishing that there is
sufficient uncertainty to inspire regulators to try to avoid situations in
which they must rely on congressional action.
C. Why Not Really Tie Regulators’ Hands? (The Limits of the
Ransom Analogy)
In removing regulators’ broader guarantee authorities, Congress was
a bit like a fictional plutocrat—let’s call him Midas—with myriad chil-
dren and grandchildren who pays ransom for a kidnapped grandchild
174 GEITHNER, supra note 1, at 178. R
175 See, e.g., id. at 432 (“We saw in 2008 that even after the panic induced by Lehman
and the falling dominos that followed, the House rejected TARP and crashed the markets
before coming to its senses.  Politicians don’t like taking votes that can be caricatured as pro-
bailout.”).
176 Wachovia’s sale to Wells Fargo followed a tortuous turn of events in which Citigroup
made an initial (seemingly) successful bid for Wachovia, and then was outbid by Wells Fargo
after most had thought the bidding was done.  For a brief account of the Wachovia-Citi-Wells-
Fargo mini-saga, see FCIC REPORT, supra note 3, at 366–71. R
177 PAULSON, supra note 22, at 317–18. R
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and, in order to discourage further kidnappings, announces that he will
never pay ransom again.  The problem, of course, is that potential kid-
nappers will not believe him—this is a classic case of “cheap talk.”  So
Midas may try to seek a pre-commitment device not to pay ransom.
Half-measures will not work, however; to the degree that Midas leaves
himself loopholes in order to pay ransom if a kidnapping should occur,
kidnappers would expect him to exploit the loopholes.  But what if Mi-
das could credibly commit to a “no ransom” strategy, either by com-
pletely tying his own hands (perhaps by putting all his wealth into an
irrevocable trust with strict instructions to the trustee not to take any
actions to facilitate the payment of ransom), or by sacrificing one or two
offspring to prove to kidnappers that his talk is not cheap?  This could
eliminate kidnappings.178
I have argued that removing guarantee authorities while retaining
weaker crisis-response tools constitutes a half measure that fails to lessen
moral hazard, but could Congress completely tie regulators’ hands?
Given its ability to rewrite laws, could it tie its own hands?  Without
getting into how this might be credibly accomplished (a constitutional
amendment?), let us assume arguendo that it could.  Would we then
solve the moral hazard problem, just as a credible policy against ransom
should eliminate kidnappings (at least those carried out with pecuniary
motives)?  Here the ransom analogy breaks down, because what public
policy should be concerned with preventing is not moral hazard per se,
but rather the devastating economic damage arising as a negative exter-
nality from a full-blown financial crisis.  As Larry Summers has ob-
served, “the prospect that people may smoke in bed is not usually taken
as an argument against the existence of fire departments.”179
How confident can we be that the credible elimination of any possi-
bility of government intervention in a crisis would actually reduce fire
damage—that is, prevent the occurrence of damaging crises?  History
should inspire an extraordinary degree of skepticism.  The basic crisis
response tools regulators have today were not in existence, for example,
in nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century America.  Did market disci-
pline prevent banking panics?  No—damaging and disruptive panics oc-
curred every decade or so.180  It was only with the introduction of the
178 See, e.g., David S. Cohen, Why the U.S. Does Not Pay Ransoms for Americans Kid-
napped by Terrorists, NEWSWEEK (Aug. 23, 2014), http://www.newsweek.com/why-us-does-
not-pay-ransoms-americans-kidnapped-terrorists-266315 (arguing that this logic is part of
what motivates the United States policy against paying ransom to terrorists).
179 Lawrence Summers, Beware Moral Hazard Fundamentalists, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 23,
2007), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/5ffd2606-69e8-11dc-a571-0000779fd2ac.html#axzz3Rr
K91FxS (attributing the analogy to Michael Mussa).
180 See, e.g., BEN S. BERNANKE, THE FEDERAL RESERVE AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 9–10
(2013) (counting six financial panics between 1873 and 1914); see also GORTON, MISUNDER-
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Federal Reserve (and its discount window as lender of last resort) in
1913, and then with deposit insurance in 1933, that we were able to
“solve” the problem of panics in traditional banking.181  Again, the larg-
est risks today lie in shadow banking, which does not formally enjoy
commercial banks’ safety net; shadow banks thus remain vulnerable to
panic.  Trying to ensure that risk-takers internalize the downside costs of
their risks is an important goal, but punishing risk-takers, no matter the
collateral damage, cannot be the overriding goal.  As Tim Geithner
writes in his memoirs, “[t]aking away the fire department’s equipment
certainly ensures that the equipment won’t be used”—thus ensuring, to
build on Summers’ observation above, that those who smoke in bed bear
the downside costs of this risky activity—”but it isn’t much of a strategy
for reducing fire damage.”182
In any event, it is not clear that completely eliminating the possibil-
ity of government intervention in a crisis would, in fact, have a salutary
effect on risk-taking—indeed, there is a plausible story that it would in-
spire a lesser degree of prudence in the financial system, though through
a different channel than the one examined in this Article.  Leaving every-
thing to market discipline could, that is, make decision makers within
banks and shadow banks less careful in avoiding downside risks if they
viewed the possibility of financial contagion as an exogenous risk.183
Contagion risk may be endogenous to the financial system as a whole,
but remain exogenous to each individual firm to the degree that its risk-
STANDING FINANCIAL CRISES, supra note 48, at 29 (quoting THEODORE GILMAN, FEDERAL R
CLEARING HOUSES 183 (1899)) (“Since 1793 [financial] panics have occurred [in the United
States] in the following years: 1797, 1811, 1813, 1816, 1819, 1825, 1837, 1847, 1857, 1866,
1873, 1884, 1890, and 1893.”).
181 In addition to the safety net, the Quiet Period depended on what Gary Gorton has
referred to as “carrots,” in the form of supernormal returns due to regulatory limits on competi-
tion, and “sticks,” in the form of direct regulation limiting bank risk-taking. GARY B. GOR-
TON, SLAPPED BY THE INVISIBLE HAND: THE PANIC OF 2007, at 54 (2010).  The supernormal
returns that created the “carrots” were facilitated by limits on branching, ceilings on the de-
posit rates that banks were allowed to pay to depositors, and the lack of other plausible debt
financing sources for businesses.  All of these began to erode starting in the 1970s and 1980s.
The carrots, however, provided an incentive for bank decision makers to protect their super-
normal returns going forward by avoiding idiosyncratic risks that could lead to their failure.
This is consistent with the argument discussed below that exposing banks to an exogenous risk
of failure could make it less careful to avoid the risk of idiosyncratic failure. See infra note
183 and accompanying text. R
182 GEITHNER, supra note 1, at 430. R
183 This account is drawn from Giovanni Dell’Ariccia & Lev Ratnovski, Bailouts and
Systemic Risk Insurance (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 13/233, 2013).
Dell’Ariccia and Ratnovski developed a model of when the “systemic risk insurance” effect—
prompting banks to be more prudent in order to protect their long-term franchise value—will
outweigh the straightforward moral hazard effect of insurance.  Their model has two key vari-
ables: “The extent of moral hazard depends on the rents that the government leaves to bailed
out banks, while the importance of the ‘systemic insurance’ effect depends on the probability
of contagion.” Id. at 5.
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taking by itself is unlikely to be decisive in triggering a panic.  The
greater the exogenous risk of a panic, the lower the firm’s long-term
franchise value.  The lower the firm’s long-term franchise value, the
more willing bank decision-makers will be to ramp up portfolio risk in
order to boost short-term profits.  Just as those living in a war zone are
probably less likely, ceteris paribus, to save for retirement,184 so banks
facing an unmitigated risk of contagion may be less concerned, for exam-
ple, about the potential long-term consequences of lowering underwriting
standards in order to increase lending volume.185
D. Regulatory Discretion or Explicit Commitment?
A threshold question in designing a safety net is whether or not it
should be automatic, as with deposit insurance, or discretionary,186 as
with most of the authorities used to bail out faltering SIFIs and their
creditors.  Different economists have reached different conclusions about
the optimal approach, depending on the parameters of their model.187
184 Id. at 3.
185 Market discipline imposed by the bank’s own creditors could counteract this dynamic
to some degree, but there are reasons to doubt it would be entirely effective.  First, deposit-like
creditors tend to exercise either no discipline at all, or to run, which is a very blunt way to
control discipline ex ante, particularly when run risk is seen to arise in large part from sources
external to the bank’s operations. See infra note 189 and accompanying text.  Second, it is R
likely that investors demanding “safe” assets neglect certain risks; the story of financial engi-
neering and structured finance leading up to the crisis is largely one of bankers manufacturing
assets that would remain safe in all circumstances except those in which the “neglected risk”—
such as housing prices falling by some threshold percentage nationwide—materialized. See
Nicola Gennaioli et al., Neglected Risks, Financial Innovation, and Financial Fragility (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 16,068, 2010), http://www.nber.org/papers/
w16068.pdf.
186 Of course, even with traditional banks, there is the possibility of invoking the systemic
risk exception to cover the losses of uninsured creditors, and the invocation of this authority is
discretionary.  12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)(G) (2013).  Note that invocation of the systemic risk
exception requires “three keys turning”: a two-thirds majority of (i) the Board of Directors of
the FDIC and (ii) the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve must recommend it; and the
Secretary of the Treasury (in consultation with the President) must make an affirmative deter-
mination of systemic risk.  12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)(G)(i).
187 See, e.g., Charles A. E. Goodhart & Haizhou Huang, A Model of the Lender of Last
Resort 25 (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 99/39, 1999), https://www.imf.org/exter-
nal/pubs/ft/wp/1999/wp9939.pdf (noting that to avoid a situation in which banks game explicit
bailout guidelines, “regulators should, and do, use ‘constructive ambiguity’ to make their deci-
sions on which banks they are likely to rescue”). But see Tito Cordella & Eduardo Levy
Yeyati, Bank Bailouts: Moral Hazard vs. Value Effect (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper
No. 99/106, 1999), https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/1999/wp99106.pdf (“[W]e show
that the ‘constructive ambiguity’ approach often recommended to attenuate moral hazard, in
which the terms of the [lender of last resort] arrangement are left to the discretion of the
central bank, is always dominated by a policy that commits to rescuing banks with certainty,
conditional upon the realization of an adverse aggregate shock.”).  For what it is worth, I
believe that Cordella and Yeyati may underestimate the opacity of real time information as a
financial crisis unfolds, as well as the nonlinear impact a particular shock may have on the
system. See supra note 149. R
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An advantage of an explicit commitment is that, if it is well-de-
signed, it will cover only specific types of creditors, rather than institu-
tions.  Thus, the FDIC has resolved hundreds of banks without sparking a
bank run, because its backstop applies only to depositors.  The institution
can fail; this helps nurture some degree of market discipline, as equity
and long-term debt claimants know they can suffer losses, and will thus
“price” the bank’s riskiness in lending them money or buying shares.188
The creditors likely to be protected by such a commitment—depositors
and their shadow banking equivalents—are, in any event, lousy discipli-
narians.189  They hold their deposits not (primarily) for the return, but in
order to have quick access to cash to be able to meet their near-term
transactional needs.190  If the deposit-like debt is functioning as it should,
it is “informationally insensitive,” above some (often very low) thresh-
old, and depositor-like creditors are rationally indifferent to information
about the borrowers’ risk.191  The kind of discipline they exercise tends
not to be a measured increase in interest rates, but rather a run—precisely
the outcome we wish to avoid.
A possible advantage of discretionary guarantee authority is that it
creates uncertainty in market actors about the likelihood of the guaran-
tees, inspiring them to exercise some market discipline; but when push
comes to shove, if guarantees are needed to save the system, regulators
can extend them.  This policy of “constructive ambiguity” can, in theory,
provide the best of both worlds, limiting both moral hazard and system-
wide instability.  In the wake of the crisis, however, the policy has been
attacked as having had the opposite effect—instilling complacency dur-
ing good times and creating destabilizing uncertainty once the crisis
hit.192
188 See Acharya et al., supra note 10 (finding that bond credit spreads do rise with portfo- R
lio risk for financial institutions that are not “too big to fail”).
189 See Anat R. Admati & Martin F. Hellwig, Does Debt Discipline Bankers?  An Aca-
demic Myth About Bank Indebtedness 4 (Rock Ctr. for Corp. Governance, Working Paper No.
132, 2013) (explaining the theory that deposits constitute an attractive type of debt because of
their liquidity, and observing that this theory “envisions depositors and other short-term credi-
tors as being unconcerned about the risk of default by the bank”); see also David Min, Under-
standing the Failures of Market Discipline 1 (Univ. of Cal., Irvine Sch. of Law, Research
Paper No. 2014-15, 2014) (arguing that the notion of market discipline in shadow banking
“relies too heavily upon investors in money instruments,” that is, deposits and deposit-like
debt, “who are relatively insensitive to risk and thus particularly poor monitors of banks”).
190 Ricks, supra note 31, at 91. R
191 GORTON, supra note 181. R
192 For a succinct statement of an analogous experience with constructive ambiguity (in
the United Kingdom rather than the United States) leading up to and during the crisis, see
Andrew Hauser, Lender of Last Resort Operations During the Financial Crisis: Seven Practi-
cal Lessons from the United Kingdom, (Bank of Int’l Settlements, Paper No. 79e, 2014), http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2504704 (“Ambiguity led to significant—and
ultimately damaging—uncertainty about the circumstances in which the Bank would lend, and
the terms and conditions at which it would do so.  Banks’ expectations in this area swung from
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Another possible advantage of discretionary authority is that it is
compatible with the sort of flexibility that I believe would make regula-
tors more confident in being tough in the early stages of market turmoil.
For example, it could allow for the guarantee of non-deposit-like debt in
the jumpiest of markets when it really would contribute to stabilization,
just as the Debt Guarantee Program did with long-term debt issuances of
banks and bank holding companies.193  In the vast majority of cases, of
course, this type of debt should be able to absorb losses without systemic
consequences; it would be extremely ill-advised to cover it with an ex-
plicit guarantee.  Discretionary authority could also allow more flexibil-
ity to address risks that arise in new markets that, perhaps, are nascent or
not yet even in existence, without a commitment to protect the first, riski-
est firms, or creditors in the market from failure.
Some may be uncomfortable handing regulators too much discre-
tionary authority, and would prefer to impose constraints to ensure that
they do not abuse their authority or waste taxpayer money.  This Article
argues that under current conditions, the half-constraints imposed on reg-
ulators make it likelier that they will waste resources bailing out firms
that should not be saved.  As argued in Part IV.C, completely tying regu-
lators’ hands is unlikely to increase financial stability or limit the costs of
financial crises.194
In the current system, then, I believe that some type of discretionary
guarantee authority is called for.  The potential costs of vesting too much
decision-making authority in one (unelected) decision-maker could be
mitigated to some degree by a process similar to the “three keys turn-
ing”—i.e., approval by the majority of the boards of the Federal Reserve
and the FDIC, along with the approval of the Treasury Secretary—re-
quired to invoke the systemic risk exception in a bank resolution or to
place a firm into Title II resolution.195
E. Why Not a Private Insurance Scheme?
Market forces in private insurance markets tend to ensure that moral
hazard costs are offset by the benefits of risk-spreading and the risk-
mitigation techniques of insurance companies.196  We cannot, however,
excess optimism about the prospects of central bank support in the pre-crisis period to excess
pessimism later in the crisis period, even long after the Bank had demonstrated its willingness
to provide truly exceptional amounts of liquidity.”).
193 See supra Part II.B.
194 See supra Part IV.C.
195 See supra note 186. R
196 If insurance is voluntary, then the mere fact that insurers are able to remain solvent is
strong prima facie evidence that the social benefits of insurance outstrip the costs.  Insurance
companies remain solvent by charging appropriate premia, making appropriate investments
with the premia they receive, and regulating the risk of the insured. See Omri Ben-Shahar &
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CJP\25-1\CJP102.txt unknown Seq: 44 23-DEC-15 16:49
138 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 25:95
automatically presume that government-provided guarantees are simi-
larly cost-justified, as government actors do not operate with the same
incentive to be profitable or the same threat of insolvency that private
insurers do.
Given the advantage of private insurance, a threshold question is
whether it could do a better job than the government at maintaining sta-
bility by providing a safety net in a cost-effective manner.  A potential
problem with this approach is that financial firms—those firms that
would purchase insurance—are under-incentivized to insure at the opti-
mal level, given the fact that the potential systemic costs of their own
failure would be borne primarily by others.  This problem could, how-
ever, be overcome simply by requiring financial firms to purchase insur-
ance at an appropriate threshold level.  A more fundamental problem is
whether any private scheme would have the firepower to forestall a true
systemic panic; if not, the moral hazard and “too-big-to-fail” problems
will simply be pushed back a level, to the undercapitalized private in-
surer.  It is hard not to cast a skeptical eye on the notion that a private
insurer could have effectively halted the run on the multi-trillion-dollar
money market fund industry in September 2008.  It is also worth observ-
ing that the track record of non-federal deposit insurance schemes in this
country has been dismal.197  For our purposes here, it is enough to note
that to serve its stabilization function effectively, a private insurance
scheme would likely require intensive government oversight with respect
to, at a minimum, maintaining appropriate capital levels, as well as a
government backstop in the case of insolvency.  The advantages of priva-
tization would, then, largely fade away.
CONCLUSION
Insurance has many virtues, but one big cost: moral hazard.  Parties
who are insured against bad outcomes often take less care in avoiding
those outcomes.  This Article has, however, argued that the lack of free-
standing guarantee authorities that could be used to insure creditors
Kyle D. Logue, Outsourcing Regulation: How Insurance Reduces Moral Hazard, 111 MICH.
L. REV. 197, 247 (2012) (“Insurers regulate risk in various ways.  From mandating specific
investments in risk reduction, to offering premium discounts for favorable claims experience,
to selling cost-containment expertise to policyholders and even designing safety technologies
and codes, insurers perform many of the same regulatory functions that government regulators
and courts perform.  However, in many (though obviously not all) situations, private insurers,
because of their inherent informational comparative advantage, should be expected to do the
job of regulation better than public regulators and courts.”).
197 RICHARD SCOTT CARNELL ET AL., THE LAW OF BANKING AND FINANCIAL INSTITU-
TIONS 272 (5th ed. 2013) (“Most economists agree that only the federal government has the
financial muscle to assure the credibility and effectiveness of deposit insurance.  Nearly all
state-sponsored insurance funds have failed disastrously.  Private insurance funds have proved
even less reliable.”).
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against losses during a financial crisis may, contrary to conventional wis-
dom, exacerbate moral hazard.  This is because regulators retain authori-
ties that, while unequal to stopping a full-blown panic, may prevent a
panic from starting in the first place through targeted interventions to
protect particular firms or their creditors.
If regulators have freestanding guarantee authorities, they can feel
more confident in taking on even a small chance of crisis-like dynamics
emerging from the failure of a systemically important financial institu-
tion, since guarantees could, as with the run on MMFs, forestall such
dynamics and significantly limit damage to the real economy.  If, on the
other hand, regulators lack strong tools in the form of guarantee authori-
ties, they will be more likely to use weak authorities to prevent a large
financial firm from failing in the first place, or its creditors from suffer-
ing losses.  In doing so, they will exacerbate moral hazard, as the weak-
est firms and their creditors come to understand that regulators are less
likely to stand by if those firms falter.  If this account is correct, it under-
mines the moral-hazard-based justification for eliminating regulators’
guarantee authorities.
While the arguments advanced in this Article do not purport to set-
tle the debate about the appropriate role of guarantees in financial regula-
tion, they bolster the view that broad and freestanding guarantee
authorities should be part of the regulatory crisis-response toolkit, and
that restoring these authorities should be a priority of financial reform
efforts.
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